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SURVEY

2012 ANNUAL SURVEY: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN SPORTS LAW
INTRODUCTION
This survey discusses sports-related cases decided by the courts between
January 1, 2012, and December 31, 2012. Not every sports-related case
decided in 2012 is included in this survey. Instead, this survey briefly
summarizes a wide range of cases that impacted the sports industry in 2012.
This survey intends to give the reader an insight into the growing industry of
sports-related legal issues and to highlight the most recent developments in
sports law. To better assist the reader, this survey is arranged alphabetically
by the specific substantive area of law associated with each sports law case.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Administrative law covers the actions of the federal, state, and local
governments, such as adjudicating, rulemaking, and regulatory enforcement.
Sports law cases rarely involve administrative law, but one occurred in 2012.
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network1
This conflict arose when the Jordan River Restoration Network opposed
Salt Lake City’s efforts to validate municipal bonds to finance the construction
of a regional sports complex. Jordan River argued that the district court
violated the Bond Validation Act and the Local Government Bonding Act
when it approved the City’s validation proceedings. Jordan River asserted
seven issues on appeal: (1) that the “validation proceedings are broad in scope
and must include consideration of any matter that may affect the validity or
legality of the bonds”;2 (2) that “notice of the validation hearing provided by
the district court did not comply with the Validation Act”;3 (3) that there was
inadequate notice of the validation hearing; (4) that they were not given the
opportunity to be heard; (5) that the complex proposed and being built was

1. See generally 293 P.3d 300 (Utah 2012).
2. Id. at 311.
3. Id.
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substantially different from what the voters passed; (6) that the city did not
follow proper procedures under the Bonding Act; and (7) that the “bond
validation petition did not present a close case.”4 Nonetheless, the Utah
Supreme Court upheld the district court’s decision and concluded that “the
district court complied with due process and properly applied the Validation
and Bonding Acts . . . .”5
ANTITRUST LAW
Antitrust law exists to protect consumers from unfair business practices
and anticompetitive behavior, such as monopolies. The Sherman Antitrust Act
prohibits monopolistic behavior and conspiracies to restrain trade. The
application of antitrust law is different within the sports law context, as courts
have noted that the sports industry is unique and presents issues not found in
other industries. Namely, sports leagues require some degree of concerted
action off the field to produce competition on the field. Thus, sports cases that
implicate antitrust law are analyzed under the rule of reason analysis, which
allows courts to balance the alleged anticompetitive behavior with any
procompetitive justifications offered by the defendant. The following case
demonstrates how antitrust law applied to the sports industry in 2012.
Agnew v. NCAA6
Two college football players, Joseph Agnew and Patrick Courtney, sued
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), alleging that two
NCAA bylaws were anticompetitive and violated the Sherman Act.
Specifically, they challenged bylaw 15.5.4, which restricts the number of
scholarships available per team, and bylaw 15.3.3.1, which prohibits multiyear scholarships. After suffering career-ending football injuries, Agnew’s
and Courtney’s scholarships were not renewed. As a result, Agnew and
Courtney alleged that the anticompetitive bylaws harmed them directly
because they had to pay for the full cost of their remaining years of education.
Agnew and Courtney alleged that “the Bylaws resulted in a horizontal
agreement to fix prices and reduce output, which caused a reduction of the
supply of bachelor’s degrees and an increase in the price for bachelor’s
degrees for those that did not have their scholarships renewed.”7
The district court dismissed the claim, stating that Agnew and Courtney
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id.
Id. at 307.
See generally 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 333.
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failed to identify a relevant commercial market. The NCAA argued that
Agnew’s and Courtney’s proffered markets were not commercial in nature
and, therefore, were not subject to antitrust laws. Agnew and Courtney argued
that the restriction on the number of scholarships was “a clear limitation on
output (that is, the number of scholarships and, therefore, bachelor’s degrees)
and the NCAA’s restriction of scholarships to one year is a clear limitation on
price (that is, the price of bachelor’s degrees and the cost that schools must
pay for student-athletes).”8 The court went through a lengthy description of
antitrust analysis but dismissed the complaint with prejudice because Agnew
and Courtney failed to amend their complaint to include a relevant market
after several opportunities to do so. The court noted that Agnew and Courtney
had at least three opportunities to amend their complaint and stated, “Plaintiffs
obviously could have established a relevant market from the outset, but they
also had the opportunity to amend their complaint and include an identification
of a cognizable market after the full briefing and argument of the NCAA’s
motion to dismiss in the California district court.”9
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The U.S. Constitution and state constitutions protect individuals from
government intrusions into various constitutional rights. The sports industry
implicates constitutional law when federal or state governmental entities, such
as athletic associations or educational institutions, violate the rights of
individuals such as spectators, coaches, or student-athletes. Long-standing
judicial precedent establishes that participation in high school and college
sports is not a constitutionally-protected right and that, by choosing to
participate in sports, those high school and collegiate athletes give up certain
constitutional rights. In sports, constitutional law cases traditionally involve
the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Doyle v. Lehi City10
William Doyle, a former volunteer youth baseball coach for the Lehi City
Recreation Department, was not selected to volunteer as a coach for the 2007
baseball season after the department received several complaints about
Doyle’s coaching behavior during the 2006 season. As a result, Doyle
purchased a billboard along a highway that displayed the slogan “Something

8. Id. at 337.
9. Id. at 347.
10. See generally 291 P.3d 853 (Utah Ct. App. 2012).
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stinks in Lehi City Recreation,”11 and he was publicly vocal about his
displeasure with the Recreation Department. After several meetings with
county officials, Doyle was still unable to obtain a volunteer coaching position
but was told he could reapply in 2008.
Doyle subsequently filed suit, alleging that the Recreation Department
“violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments by denying
him the opportunity to volunteer as a baseball coach . . . —a form of
retaliation, . . . for exercising his free speech rights to raise concerns about the
management of the City’s youth baseball program.”12 He then appealed the
lower court’s decision after it granted summary judgment in favor of the city.
Doyle argued that the court “erred in striking portions of affidavits he
submitted in opposition to [the city’s] motion for summary judgment, in
concluding that [city employees] were entitled to qualified immunity, and in
determining that his notice of claim was inadequate, thereby barring his
defamation and breach of contract causes of action.”13
The court rejected these claims, stating that Doyle “failed to demonstrate
. . . that an unpaid, limited-term, volunteer position is a valuable government
benefit, and that failure to appoint or reappoint an individual to such a position
because of the prospective volunteer’s exercise of his right to free speech
triggers First Amendment scrutiny.”14 In affirming the lower court’s decision,
the court further noted that if the city was protected by qualified immunity
against the First Amendment claim, the city was protected from a Fourteenth
Amendment claim as well.
CONTRACT LAW
Contracts play an important role in the collegiate, minor league, and
professional sports industries through sponsorship agreements, athlete and
coach contracts, spectator waivers, television deals, and other endorsement
agreements. The following cases examine numerous contract issues that arose
in the sports industry during 2012.
Cook v. Kudlacz15
Mary Ann Cook and Rachel Cook sued Cardinal Mooney High School;
the school’s principal, Sister Jane Marie Kudlacz; and the school’s tennis
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 857.
Id. at 858.
Id. at 856.
Id. at 862.
See generally 974 N.E.2d 706 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012).
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coach, Sandra Ketchem alleging breach of contract. The lower court ruled in
favor of the defendants, stating that there was no breach of contract and no
evidence of harassment or intimidation. The lower court found that, though
adolescents have particular sensitivities, there exists no remedy in law for hurt
feelings.
The Cooks alleged that, during the 2008–2009 and 2009–2010 school
years, Coach Ketchem and the tennis team harassed Rachel and that the
principal and the school were aware of the conduct but failed to take action.
The court first addressed the breach of contract claim. The Cooks argued that
the Cardinal Mooney Handbook, which prohibited harassment and bullying
behavior, created a contract between the school and the Cooks. Addressing
this claim, the court noted that a breach of contract would only be found if one
of two conditions were met: (1) where the evidence clearly showed that the
school violated the contract, or (2) where “‘the private school clearly abuse[d]
its discretion in applying its disciplinary standards in such a manner as to
depart from the purpose of the educational contract . . . .’”16
The alleged bullying included Coach Ketchem creating new team rules
prohibiting unexcused absences from games and practices and using these
rules to punish Rachel for going on a family vacation. The court ruled that it
was within the coach’s discretion to determine which absences were excused
or unexcused, and it found that this behavior did not amount to bullying or
harassment. Additionally, the Cooks alleged that one of Rachel’s teammates
sent Rachel a threatening text message and the school failed to take action.
Cardinal Mooney presented evidence showing that the school investigated the
text message incident and deemed the message non-threatening. The court
ruled that the school’s investigation was sufficient and that the matter did not
amount to a breach of contract.
The Cooks also introduced evidence that other girls on the team isolated
Rachel by refusing to warm up with her or to tell her which uniform to wear
because they were unhappy with her for missing matches. The court ruled that
this behavior also did not amount to bullying or harassment. The Cooks
further alleged that Coach Ketchem unfairly moved Rachel’s position in the
lineup. The court stated that a player’s position is within the coach’s
discretion and is not a matter in which the court should become involved.
Accordingly, the court concluded that none of the Cooks’ allegations
amounted to actionable claims; therefore, there was no breach of contract.

16. Id. at 713 (quoting Frazier v. Cincinnati Sch. of Med. Massage, No. C-060359, 2007 WL
1452586, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. May 18, 2007)).
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Summey v. Monroe County Department of Education17
In 2007, the Monroe County Department of Education hired Ronnie
Summey as a teacher at Sequoyah High School. At this time, Summey signed
an agreement to be the high school’s head football coach. In 2008, when his
original contract expired, Summey signed another one-year contract to teach at
Sequoyah High School, which also included a coaching supplement. In May
2008, after a losing football season, the school district informed Summey that
he could either resign from the head coaching position or be terminated.
When Summey approached the director of schools about the dispute, the
director reassigned him to another position as a physical education teacher at
one of the district’s middle schools. Summey refused to accept the position
and did not return to work.
Summey sued the school district for breach of contract after it terminated
him from his position as the head football coach at Sequoyah High School.
The lower court ruled in favor of the school district, and Summey appealed.
Summey argued that the school district breached the contract and that his
subsequent reassignment was unlawful. The appeals court ruled against
Summey, noting that his contract clearly stated that “the employee agrees to
work in any building or department or perform such duty as may be assigned
or required by the director of schools.”18 Summey further argued that the
school district’s transfer was unlawful, but the appeals court again ruled
against him, concluding that it was within the director’s discretion to transfer a
coach to a full-time teaching position. The appeals court concluded that
Summey breached the contract when he refused his reassignment.
COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT
The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) is an international arbitration
body headquartered in Lausanne, Switzerland, that also has courts in New
York and Sydney, Australia. CAS also sets up temporary courts (the CAS ad
hoc Division) at the Olympic sites to hear disputes that arise out of the Games.
Generally, CAS has jurisdiction to hear disputes based on arbitration
agreements between the parties. Because of the large amount of cases
involving the Olympic Movement, many national and international sports
organizations consistently use CAS to resolve their disputes. As a result, CAS
decisions have developed a type of precedent known as lex sportiva. The
following CAS decisions represent some of the areas in which CAS hears and
17. See generally No. E2011-01400-COA-R3-CV, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 343 (Tenn. Ct.
App. May 29, 2012).
18. Id. at *9.
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resolves disputes, including fines, fundamental rights, team member selection,
and penalties.
Adamu v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)19
Dr. Amos Adamu, a former member of the FIFA Executive Committee,
appealed a FIFA Appeals Committee’s decision that found that he breached
the FIFA Code of Ethics and that resulted in a ban from football-related
activity for three years and a fine of 10,000 Swiss Francs. An undercover
journalist for a British newspaper, the Sunday Times, recorded Dr. Adamu
accepting bribes to support the United States’ bid for the 2018 and 2022 FIFA
World Cups. The Appeals Committee found that the proceedings before the
FIFA Ethics Committee were properly carried out and that the recordings by
the Sunday Times were admissible evidence against Dr. Adamu. The CAS
panel concluded that Dr. Adamu was involved in a bribery scandal over FIFA
World Cup votes; thus, the FIFA Appeals Committee did not issue a
disproportionate sanction. Accordingly, the CAS panel upheld the original
sanction in its entirety.
Armstrong v. World Curling Federation (WCF)20
James Armstrong, a Canadian curler, appealed the WCF’s decision that
found him guilty of a doping offense. Armstrong submitted to an out-ofcompetition doping test in December 2011 and tested positive for Tamoxifen,
a prohibited substance. As a result, the WCF suspended Armstrong for
eighteen months. Armstrong appealed to CAS, seeking to overturn the WCF’s
decision and to reduce his suspension. Armstrong contended that he
mistakenly took one of his deceased wife’s medications (the Tamoxifen) in
place of his own prescribed medication (ASA 81mg), which was similar in
size, shape, and color to the Tamoxifen. Armstrong argued that the WCF
erred when it suspended him for eighteen months because he did not intend to
take the banned substance and it did not enhance his performance. The WCF
contended that Armstrong did not meet the World Anti-Doping Agency
(WADA) Code’s Article 10.5 standards because he could not identify how the
banned substance entered his body and, therefore, did not qualify for a reduced
suspension.
The CAS panel concluded that Armstrong did bear a certain amount of
fault for mixing his medication containers with his wife’s; therefore, he was
not entitled to a complete elimination of sanction. The panel also concluded
19. See generally CAS 2011/A/2426.
20. See generally CAS 2012/A/2756.
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that Article 10.5 of the WADA Code applied because Armstrong established
that the Tamoxifen entered his system when he accidently took one of his
wife’s pills. The panel found that Armstrong did not take the Tamoxifen to
enhance his performance because he took the medication by accident and
provided expert testimony showing that taking Tamoxifen would be dangerous
for him due to an existing medical condition. The panel ultimately concluded
that Armstrong committed the doping offense through no significant fault or
negligence of his own and reduced his suspension to six months.
Balciunaite v. Lithuanian Athletics Federation (LAF) & International Ass’n of
Athletics Federations (IAAF)21
This arbitration proceeding arose from an LAF and IAAF decision to
suspend Zivile Balciunaite, a Lithuanian marathon runner. After winning the
marathon event at the 2010 European Championships, Balciunaite submitted a
urine sample that tested positive for testosterone and epitestosterone, which
are prohibited substances banned under the IAAF Anti-Doping Regulations.
As a result, the LAF’s Disciplinary Commission charged her with an antidoping rule violation and suspended her from competition for two years.
Balciunaite appealed the decision to CAS and argued that the LAF and IAAF
violated her fundamental right to be present for the B sample’s opening and
testing, that they denied her a timely and fair hearing, and that the LAF’s
experts did not consider all of her arguments.
Balciunaite first alleged that the LAF violated “her fundamental right to be
present when the B sample was opened and analyzed”22 because an IAAF rule
states that an athlete has the right to observe the opening and testing of a B
sample following a positive A sample. Balciunaite was present when the
sample was unsealed, but she left the facility after giving her contact
information and did not observe the testing of the sample. Upon review of the
facts, the CAS panel found that no one forced Balciunaite away from the
testing facility; thus, no violation of her right to be present occurred.
Balciunaite’s second allegation was that LAF made a decision to suspend
her more than seven months after the IAAF informed LAF of the violation,
despite the fact that the LAF has a time limit of three months to make that
decision. The CAS panel found that LAF held its first hearing on December 1
and that Balciunaite submitted additional evidence on February 23. Due to the
extra evidence, the LAF’s final decision on April 5 was within an appropriate
amount of time because it occurred within three months of the submission of

21. See generally CAS 2011/A/2414.
22. Id. ¶ 6.1.

SURVEY FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

5/7/2013 2:37 PM

2012 SURVEY

509

the additional evidence. Therefore, the CAS panel concluded that LAF did not
violate Balciunaite’s right to a fair and timely hearing.
Lastly, Balciunaite alleged that the LAF only made a partial evaluation
before making its final ruling. Balciunaite argued that the LAF only saw
partial documents and that the LAF’s experts were not in a position to evaluate
the documents that they received. The CAS panel found that the proof offered
by the LAF clearly showed that the analysis used by IAAF was reliable and
that the charges brought by Balciunaite did not have any merit. Ultimately,
the CAS panel rejected all of Balciunaite’s arguments and confirmed the
LAF’s decision.
Beresford v. Equestrian Australia23
The Equestrian Australia Appeal Tribunal dismissed Haley Beresford’s
appeal challenging her exclusion from the Australian Equestrian team in favor
of Kirsty Oatley. Beresford appealed the decision, contending that Equestrian
Australia breached its rules and that the appeals tribunal based its decision on
an error of law. In preparation for selection of the London Olympic Games
Equestrian Dressage Team, Beresford was placed on the Short List for
nomination on March 5, while Oatley was not added to the list until April 27.
Beresford contended that to be considered for the Olympic Team, one must be
placed on the Short List by March 5 and that Oatley did not meet this
requirement.
The nomination criteria set forth by Equestrian Australia regulates election
to the Australian Equestrian Team and states, “‘A Short List of up to eight (8)
horse and [a]thlete combination[s] will be chosen . . . on or before 5 March
2012 to compete in the two Nomination Events . . . .’”24 Furthermore,
following early nomination, the selection panel has discretion to nominate
remaining members to the dressage team. The CAS panel noted that the
selection panel’s objective is ultimately to select the horse and athlete team
that has the greatest potential to be successful in Olympic competition. As
such, the CAS panel found that the nomination criteria does not proscribe that
the candidates must be included on the Short List. Accordingly, the CAS
panel dismissed Beresford’s appeal.

23. See generally CAS 2012/A/2837.
24. Id. ¶ 13 (quoting 2012 AUSTRALIAN OLYMPIC TEAM: EQUESTRIAN AUSTRALIA,
NOMINATION CRITERIA § A.3 (2012)).
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Brazilian Olympic Committee (BOC) & Brazilian Taekwondo Confederation
(BTC) & Ferreira v. World Taekwondo Federation (WTF) & Comité Olímpico
Mexicano & Federación Mexicana de Taekwondo & Villa25
The BOC, the BTC, and Márcio Wenceslau Ferreira, a Brazilian
taekwondo athlete—collectively known as the appellants—appealed a WTF
decision that precluded Ferreira from participating in the 2012 Olympic
Games. In November 2011, Ferreira competed in the Pan-American
Qualification Tournament in hopes of earning a place in the 2012 Olympics.
Ferreira subsequently lost the bronze medal contest and did not earn one of the
three available Olympic spots. After the competition, the BOC appealed the
contested result to the WTF and alleged that there was a scoring mistake made
that led to an unfair result. The WTF found that the scoring decision could not
be challenged because Ferreira’s coach had used his allotted amount of
appeals during the match itself. Furthermore, the WTF found that it could not
give the BOC special consideration in the appeals process as it would violate
the Olympic Charter.
The appellants requested that CAS set aside the WTF’s decision, declare
Ferreira the victor of the match, and award him a spot in the 2012 Olympic
Games. The appellants argued that the WTF’s decision was inaccurate
because there was no implementation of a fair and transparent judging system
and that mistakes made by the judges went uncorrected. Furthermore, the
appellants argued that the decision was reviewable because it was not a fieldof-play decision, but rather it was an error in precedent as the points in
question related to an illegal kick to the head; therefore, a CAS panel could
overturn the WTF’s decision. Upon review, the CAS panel found that the
WTF’s decision was a field-of-play decision that would fall under the WTF
competencies during the course of an event; thus, the result is strictly under
the WTF’s control.
CAS jurisprudence allows for a review of field-of-play decisions only
when there is direct evidence of bad faith or arbitrary decision-making
showing prejudice for or against a specific athlete or team. Although this
“places a high hurdle on the applicant seeking to review a field[-]of[-]play
decision . . . , if the hurdle were to be lower, the flood-gates would be opened
and any unsatisfied participant would be able to seek the review of a field[]of[-]play decision.”26 When it is a judge’s or referee’s responsibility to make
a decision in a sport, athletes must accept that the judge or referee will make
the decision from his point of view. The panel noted that although judges may

25. See generally CAS 2012/A/2731.
26. Id. ¶ 108.

SURVEY FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

5/7/2013 2:37 PM

2012 SURVEY

511

make mistakes, not every mistake is reviewable. “The field[-]of[-]play
decision doctrine prevents the [CAS p]anel from reviewing a field [-]of[-]play
decision on the mere assertion that an applicant disagrees with it.”27 Because
this case involved a field-of-play decision, the CAS panel held that it did not
have the authority to overturn the WTF’s decision.
British Olympic Ass’n (BOA) v. WADA28
The BOA, the national Olympic committee of the United Kingdom,
appealed WADA’s decision that a BOA bylaw did not comply with the
WADA Code. The BOA bylaw in question stated that if an athlete is found
guilty of a doping offense, he is not considered eligible by the BOA to receive
the benefit or accreditation as a member of Team Great Britain for any
Olympic Games. WADA challenged the BOA bylaw because it constituted a
double sanction, which it argued violated the WADA Code. National Olympic
committees, such as the BOA, are required to comply with the WADA Code’s
anti-doping regulations.
The BOA bylaw’s effect was that once an athlete was found guilty of
doping, the bylaw automatically rendered that athlete ineligible to be selected
for Team Great Britain. Further, the BOA bylaw rendered an athlete
immediately ineligible to compete for life. WADA argued that the bylaw
imposed a permanent ineligibility punishment on athletes not found in the
WADA Code. Additionally, this extra time period was a sanction on top of
those sanctions already provided for in the WADA Code. The CAS panel
found that the bylaw constituted an additional doping sanction; therefore, the
BOA bylaw did not comply with the WADA Code.
Fusimalohi v. FIFA29
Ahongalu Fusimalohi, a former member of FIFA’s Executive Committee,
appealed a FIFA Appeals Committee decision that found him guilty of
breaching the FIFA Code of Ethics, banned him from football-related
activities for two years, and imposed a fine of 7500 Swiss Francs. Fusimalohi
was on record accepting bribes from an “undercover Sunday Times journalist
posing as a lobbyist purporting to support the [U.S.] football federation’s bid
for the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups.”30 The Appeals Committee found
that the FIFA Ethics Committee carried out the proceedings properly and that
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. ¶ 110.
See generally CAS 2011/A/2658.
See generally CAS 2011/A/2425.
Id. ¶ 2.
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the journalist’s recordings were admissible evidence against Fusimalohi. The
Appeals Committee concluded that the evidence was “necessary and
appropriate, served a justified purpose . . . [,] and [was] achieved in the public
interest, which ‘clearly outweighed any disadvantages to the Appellant that
might have resulted from the breach of any law during the procurement of the
information in question.’”31
In May 2011, Fusimalohi filed a statement of appeal before CAS, arguing
that it should overturn or reduce his sentence. He argued that he perceived he
was at a job interview and that there was nothing inappropriate about the
meeting with the undercover journalist. Fusimalohi also argued that FIFA’s
proceedings were too hasty and denied him due process. The CAS panel
ultimately concluded that it is “essential for sporting regulators not to tolerate
any kinds of corruption and to impose sanctions sufficient to serve as an
effective deterrent to people who might otherwise be tempted to consider
adopting improper conducts for their personal gain”32 and upheld FIFA’s
sanction.
Hui v. International Weightlifting Federation (IWF)33
This arbitration arose on appeal from the IWF’s decision to suspend Liao
Hui, a Chinese weightlifter, for four years based on an Adverse Analytical
Finding (AAF) of prohibited substances in his urine sample. On the morning
of September 2, 2010, a WADA-accredited Beijing laboratory gave Hui a
mandatory anti-doping test, which reported a negative result. Later that same
day, IWF doping control officers subjected Hui to another test. The results of
the second test, both the A and B samples, showed an AAF for boldenone, a
banned substance according to the WADA prohibited substance list. In a
hearing in front of the IWF Doping Hearing Panel, the panel found that Hui
“failed to establish on the balance of probabilities that a departure from the
International Standard occurred”34 in the transportation and testing of his
sample. Thus, the IWF suspended Hui from competition for four years
pursuant to Article 10.2 of the IWF Anti-Doping Policy (IWF ADP).
Hui appealed the IWF’s decision to CAS on grounds that the IWF did not
establish a doping violation and, if a violation was established, that he should
only be suspended for a period of two years due to the fact that the IWF ADP
provisions do not comply with the WADA Code. Article 10.2 of WADA

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. ¶ 31 (quoting FIFA Appeals Comm. (Zurich, Switz. Feb. 2, 2011)) (emphasis omitted).
Id. ¶ 165.
See generally CAS 2011/A/2612.
Id. ¶ 15 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted).
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Code states that a first-time finding of use of prohibited substances shall result
in two years of ineligibility, whereas the IWF ADP provides that the first-time
finding of prohibited substances may result in up to four years of ineligibility.
The WADA Code allows for a four-year sanction to be imposed upon athletes
if it is established that there were aggravating circumstances surrounding the
individual athlete that justify an increase in the sanction; however, if it is
found that the athlete did not knowingly commit the doping offense, then the
sanction is limited to two years.
In this case, the panel concluded that the IWF did not prove an existence
of aggravating circumstances, and there was no indication that Hui committed
the violation “‘as part of a doping plan or scheme, either individually or
involving a conspiracy.’”35 Hui was aware at the time he submitted the first
sample, which tested negative for banned substances, that another test would
occur shortly thereafter. Additionally, he submitted further samples in the
month prior to the sample in question that tested negatively as well. The CAS
panel found that there was no justification behind the four-year period of
ineligibility imposed by the IWF and that the offense committed was only
subject to a two-year sanction. Thus, the CAS panel reduced Hui’s sanction
from four years to two years.
Köllerer v. Ass’n of Tennis Professionals (ATP) & Women’s Tennis Ass’n &
International Tennis Federation (ITF) & Grand Slam Committee36
Daniel Köllerer, an Austrian professional tennis player, appealed a ruling
by the ATP, the ITF, the Women’s Tennis Association, and the Grand Slam
Committee (collectively referred to as the governing bodies) that found
Köllerer guilty of three counts of attempted match fixing. In the appeal,
Köllerer argued that they did not sufficiently prove the charges against him.
The standard of proof that the Governing Bodies needed to meet was that the
charges of “attempted match fixing [were] more likely to be true than not
true[,]”37 a standard of proof established in the consent form signed by
Köllerer in 2009. The CAS panel found that the evidence the governing
bodies presented during the hearing was more than sufficient to justify the
charges against Köllerer; thus, the CAS panel upheld the governing bodies’
decision to suspend Köllerer for life

35. Id. ¶ 111 (quoting WADA MODEL RULES FOR INTERNATIONAL FEDERATIONS § 10.6 cmt.
(2009)) (emphasis omitted).
36. See generally CAS 2011/A/2490.
37. Id. ¶ 82.

SURVEY FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

514

5/7/2013 2:37 PM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:2

Kutrovsky v. ITF38
Dimitar Kutrovsky, a professional tennis player from Bulgaria, appealed
the ITF’s decision that found him guilty of a doping offense and subjected him
to a two-year ban. Kutrovsky submitted a urine sample during the SAP Open
Tennis Tournament in San Jose, California, in February 2012. The sample
tested positive for methylhexaneamine (MHA), and the ITF charged
Kutrovsky with a doping offense.
Kutrovsky allegedly purchased a
supplement called Jack3d from a GNC store and cross-referenced the
ingredients with the prohibited substance list. The product label included the
ingredient “‘1,3-Dimethylamylamine HCI,’ which is another name for MHA,
which name does not appear on the WADA Prohibited List.”39 Kutrovsky
contended that the ITF should reduce his sanction because he did not
knowingly take the prohibited substance with the intent to improve his
performance. The ITF contended that “if an athlete takes a supplement in
order to enhance his sport performance, knowing that it contains a particular
substance, then he intends to take that substance to enhance his sport
performance . . . even if he does not know that the substance is banned in his
sport.”40
The CAS panel noted that under Article 10.4 of the WADA Code,
Kutrovsky must satisfy two conditions to allow for a reduction in his sentence:
first, the athlete must establish how the substance entered his body, and
second, the athlete must establish that the use of the substance was not
intended to enhance performance. The CAS panel found that Kutrovsky
satisfied the first condition by identifying Jack3d as the source of the
prohibited substance, but he failed to satisfy the second condition because he
intended for Jack3d to enhance his performance by shortening his recovery
time. The CAS panel also considered the fact that Kutrovsky did not list
Jack3d as a supplement on his disclosure statement and concluded that Article
10.4 of the Code did not apply to Kutrovsky’s situation. However, the CAS
panel ultimately concluded that Kutrovsky’s sentence should be reduced under
Article 10.5.2 of the Code, which provides for reductions based on violations
in which the athlete bears “No Significant Fault or Negligence.” As a result,
the CAS panel reduced Kutrovsky’s ineligibility period to fifteen months.

38. See generally CAS 2012/A/2804.
39. Id. ¶ 8.2.1.
40. Id. ¶ 8.16.6.
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Lynch v. Horse Sport Ireland Ltd. (HSI) & Olympic Council of Ireland
(OCI)41
Denis Lynch, an Irish equestrian show jumping rider, appealed a decision
of HSI, the governing body for Irish equestrian sport, and the OCI, the body
responsible for selecting athletes to represent Ireland at the 2012 Olympics,
that banned him from competing at the 2012 London Olympic Games. The
OCI has absolute discretion when selecting athletes for competition in the
Olympic Games; thus, it is not bound by the HSI’s nominations. HSI
nominated Lynch to be considered by the OCI, although the nomination was
pending its review of Lynch’s earlier disqualification from an event due to a
finding of hypersensitivity of his horse’s legs. Hypersensitivity is a
particularly important concern for the OCI because a 2008 Irish Gold Medalist
was disqualified for this same reason. Because of the HSI’s concerns, Lynch
met with OCI members prior to the selection of an athlete to discuss concerns
arising from his disqualification.
After the meeting, HSI and the OCI were not satisfied with the
explanation given by Lynch and formally conveyed their decision not to select
him as a member of the 2012 Olympic Team. Following the notification,
Lynch submitted a letter to HSI asking for details of the appeal procedure.
Lynch was notified that he may appeal to the OCI pursuant to clause 5.2 of the
Agreement for Selection of Athletes for the Sport Equestrian. Despite this
notification, there was no further communication between Lynch and the OCI.
Subsequently, Lynch appealed to CAS, challenging HSI’s decision to
withdraw his nomination. The Arbitration Rules for the Olympic Games
(CAS ad hoc Rules) and Chapter 12 of the Swiss Private International Law
Act of 18 December 1987 (PIL Act) govern CAS proceedings at the Olympics.
Pursuant to Article 17 of the CAS ad hoc Rules, decisions must be made
“‘pursuant to the Olympic Charter, the applicable regulations, general
principles of law and the rules of law, the application of which it deems
appropriate.’”42 In the instant case, all parties resided in Ireland, all
contractual relations between them were made in Ireland, and the dispute arose
out of the athlete’s ineligibility for the Irish Olympic Team; therefore, Irish
law governed the dispute.
Article 1 of the CAS ad hoc Rules further provides that “in the case of a
request for arbitration against a decision pronounced by a National Olympic
Committee, the Claimant must, before filing a request for the dispute[,] . . .

41. See generally CAS ad hoc Division 2012/03 (O.G. London).
42. Id. ¶ 2.2.3 (quoting CAS, ARBITRATION RULES FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES art. 13 (2012)).
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exhaust[] all internal remedies . . . .”43 Because Lynch did not proceed with
the OCI after being notified by HSI that this was the next step in contesting a
decision, the CAS panel did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute pursuant
to Article 1 of the CAS ad hoc Rules.
Peternell v. South African Sports Confederation and Olympic Committee
(SASCOC) & South African Equestrian Federation (SAEF)44
This arbitration proceeding arose out of a dispute between Alexander
Peternell, a South African event rider, the SASCOC, and the SAEF about the
selection of members to the South African Olympic team. Peternell appealed
the SASCOC’s decision to include a different athlete and horse for the 2012
London Olympic Games, claiming it violated the selection criteria published
by the SASCOC and the SAEF.
Peternell contended that he met the eligibility standards for selection to the
2012 Olympic Team when he represented South Africa at the World
Equestrian Games and appeared on the Olympic Riders Rankings. Despite
satisfying the eligibility requirements, Peternell argued that the SASCOC and
SAEF failed to properly apply the selection criteria when selecting the team.
The SASCOC and SAEF contended that Peternell did not meet their eligibility
standards because he did not receive a recommendation from SASCOC to
represent South Africa prior to the competitions.
The questions for this arbitration proceeding involved whether Peternell
was eligible for selections and whether the SASCOC and SAEF properly
applied the selection criteria in making the decision to exclude Peternell from
the Olympic team. The SAEF did not set an express deadline for riders to
submit requests for recommendation to represent a country in competitions;
therefore, when Peternell appeared on the Olympic Riders Rankings, he met
the requirements for eligibility. Accordingly, the CAS panel found that
because Peternell was eligible for selection, the SASCOC and SAEF
misapplied the selection criteria when they chose a rider who was over two
hundred places behind Peternell in the world rankings. Accordingly, the
SASCOC and SAEF had to place Peternell on the team.
Rodriguez v. Real Federación Española de Atletismo (RFEA) & Comité
Olímpico Español (COE), & Consejo Superior de Deportes (CSD)45
The RFEA and COE banned Ángel Mullera Rodriguez (Mullera) from
43. Id. ¶ 2.2.8.
44. See generally CAS ad hoc Division 2012/01 (O.G. London).
45. See generally CAS ad hoc Division 2012/06 (O.G. London).
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competing in the 2012 London Olympics. Mullera appealed to CAS,
challenging the legality of his exclusion from competing on the Spanish
Olympic Team.
On July 9, 2012, RFEA selected Mullera to be a member of the Spanish
Olympic Team. On July 19, 2012, a Spanish newspaper published an article
that included an email conversation between Mullera and an unnamed trainer
regarding doping practice; of particular importance was Mullera’s statement
explicitly asking the trainer for advice on doping protocols and passing antidoping tests. Following the newspaper publication, RFEA met with Mullera
and informed him that it received notification of the emails in the prior
months, and it subsequently subjected Mullera to multiple anti-doping control
tests, none of which resulted in any AAFs indicating doping. After the
meeting, the Technical Commission of RFEA informed Mullera that, after
reviewing the circumstances surrounding his case, it had decided to preclude
him from participating on the Spanish team in the 2012 London Olympic
Games.
Following the commission’s notification, the RFEA Disciplinary
Committee rejected an appeal by Mullera to open proceedings regarding his
anti-doping violation. Days later, the committee opened proceedings against
Mullera regarding his public acts that went against the Spanish sports
community’s dignity and decorum; this procedure is currently pending.
During this time, Mullera appealed to CAS and requested reinstatement to
the Spanish Olympic Team. Specifically, he argued that the commission did
not have the authority to sanction him for doping or to impose other
disciplinary matters as that right was reserved for the disciplinary committee.
In response, the commission submitted that it had the sole discretion in
selecting members of the Spanish Olympic Team and that Mullera’s exclusion
was not a sanction but simply an exclusion from the team. Furthermore,
RFEA suggested that, because of the publicity surrounding the doping
inquiries in Mullera’s emails, his inclusion on the team would disrupt the
harmony of the Spanish contingent. Justifying their decision, RFEA cited to
Rule 258/2011 of its selection criteria, which states that commission has the
“‘right to make its choice of the athletes . . . [with] its own discretion and
technical criteria prevailing in all cases over any other circumstance.’”46
The CAS panel found that RFEA’s consideration of the “team spirit” did
not fall under the category of “technical reasoning” as prescribed by Rule
258/2011. Because RFEA did not provide sufficient evidence that including
Mullera on the team would affect the team’s spirit, the CAS panel found that

46. Id. ¶ 7.1 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).
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Mullera was arbitrarily excluded from competition and that his exclusion
violated RFEA’s selection criteria. The CAS panel ultimately concluded that
“under the current rules and considering the explanation given by the RFEA,
the RFEA may not exclude Mr. Mullera from the Spanish team for the London
Olympic Games.”47
Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) v. International Sailing Federation
(ISAF)48
This appeal arose out of a dispute between the ROC and the ISAF
regarding the early termination of the Elliott 6m class of the Olympic
women’s match racing sailing competition between the Russian and Spanish
teams. Semifinal races in the Elliott 6m division usually consist of a best of
five format, with the winner being the first team to win three points. On
August 10, during the 2012 Olympic competition, the ISAF terminated the
semifinal round after three races, with the Spanish team leading 2-1, due to a
lack of wind. Following the termination of the semifinal race, the ISAF
declared the Spanish team the winner. The Russian team did not formally
request redress or review to the ISAF’s jury office after the event.
Subsequently, the ROC appealed to CAS on the evening of the race and
asked CAS to overturn the cancellation of the last two races and to require the
ISAF to conduct the fourth and fifth races on August 11. The ROC claimed
that, per “Article 13.2.2 of the London 2012 Olympic Sailing Competition
Notice of Race [(Sailing Notice)], ‘the winner of all knockout rounds will be
the first to score three points.’”49 Furthermore, the ROC argued that, because
article 33.2.4 did not specify that a winner could be declared in semifinal races
unless a team had achieved three points, Spain should not have been declared
the winner of the race. The ROC noted that given the urgency of the matter,
an immediate decision by a CAS ad hoc Division was necessary.
In response to the ROC’s appeal, the ISAF argued that the ROC failed to
exhaust all available internal remedies before appealing to the CAS ad hoc
Division; therefore, CAS did not have jurisdiction over the matter.
Specifically, the ISAF argued that the ROC should have filed a request with
the ISAF jury office following the termination of the race pursuant to article
62.1(a) of the racing rules. Article 62.1(a) allows parties two hours after a
ruling to request further information if there is a challenge to an official ruling.
47. Id. ¶ 7.9.
48. See generally CAS ad hoc Division 2012/11 (O.G. London).
49. Id. ¶ 4.1 (quoting INTERNATIONAL SAILING FEDERATION & LONDON ORGANISING
COMMITTEE OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES AND PARALYMPIC GAMES, LONDON 2012 OLYMPIC SAILING
COMPETITION NOTICE OF RACE art. 13.2.2 (2012)) (emphasis omitted).
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Furthermore, the ISAF stated that the decision to terminate the race was a
field-of-play decision made in accordance with article C10.5 of the racing
rules, which states that a team leading at termination is to be declared the
winner of the competition.
The Olympic Charter, which governs disputes arising in connection with
the Olympic Games, states that an appeal should be submitted directly to CAS
in accordance with the Code of Sports-Related Arbitration. Article 1 of the
CAS ad hoc Rules for the Olympic Games states that “[t]he purpose of the
present Rules is to provide, in the interests of the athletes and of sport, for the
resolution by arbitration of any disputes . . . , insofar as they arise during the
Olympic Games or during a period of ten days preceding the Opening
Ceremony of the Olympic Games.”50 The CAS ad hoc Rules also provide
that, before filing with CAS, the claimant must exhaust all internal remedies
pursuant to the individual sporting body’s regulations.
Pursuant to Article 62 of the racing rules, the ROC was required to submit
a request for redress with the ISAF within two hours of any disputed decision.
The CAS ad hoc Division could not find any reasoning, nor did the ROC
provide any reasoning, as to why the ROC did not submit a timely request to
the ISAF jury office. Because the ROC failed to exhaust all internal remedies
prior to appealing to the CAS ad hoc Division, CAS did not have jurisdiction
over this matter.
Rybka v. Union of European Football Ass’n (UEFA)51
This case was an appeal of a UEFA decision to suspend Oleksandr Rybka,
a professional soccer player, from playing soccer for two years because of a
doping offense. In 2011, UEFA conducted an off-season doping control test
on Rybka, which resulted in an AAF of Furosemide, a prohibited substance.
Following the positive test, a hearing ensued between UEFA and Rybka.
UEFA found that Rybka’s explanation as to how he ingested the substance (he
alleged that his wife gave him a colorless, odorless glass of water spiked with
the substance) was not sufficient to dismiss the claim. Subsequently, UEFA
suspended Rybka from competition for the standard two-year period.
UEFA rules provide that it is the players’ duty to ensure that no prohibited
substances enter their bodies; intent, fault, or knowing use on the players’ part
is not required to establish a doping violation. If a player can establish that he
bears no fault or negligence and can explain how the substance entered his
body, the suspension may be lifted. If a player or another individual can

50. Id. ¶ 5.2 (CAS, supra note 42, art.1).
51. See generally CAS 2012/A/2759.
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establish that the player bore no significant fault or negligence, the suspension
may be reduced to no less than half of the otherwise applicable suspension
period. To establish lack of significant fault or negligence, a player must
show, on a balance of probabilities, how the substance entered his body.
After Rybka presented facts and various explanations as to how the
substance entered his body, he failed to persuade the CAS panel that his
degree of fault warranted a reduction in his suspension. Accordingly, the
panel upheld UEFA’s two-year sanction.
Savic v. Professional Tennis Integrity Officers (PTIOs)52
David Savic, a Serbian professional tennis player, appealed the PTIOs’
decision that found him guilty of committing a corruption offense. The PTIOs
fined Savic $100,000 and declared him permanently ineligible to play
professional tennis. He appealed the PTIOs’ decision to CAS, hoping it would
annul the decision. The PTIOs found that Savic attempted to corrupt another
professional tennis team by getting a player to throw one of his matches. This
decision was based on evidence that Savic called and texted a player on the
team, offering him $30,000 to lose the first set of his first match at a
professional tournament. The player declined the offer and reported Savic.
On appeal to CAS, Savic argued that a third party contacted the player and
made it appear as if he was responsible. Savic’s expert witness testified that
the calls and texts “‘could quite easily have been sent/carried out by a [t]hird
[p]arty without the knowledge or complicity of [Savic] but using his name,
mobile phone, mobile phone number and Skype details’, [sic] a practice
known as ‘spoofing[.]’”53 The PTIOs argued that this argument was the “least
plausible scenario in the present case, given all the personal and contact details
to which such an impersonator would be required to be privy [and that] the
fact that spoofing can occur is by itself no evidence that it actually occurred in
this case.”54
On appeal, the CAS panel had to determine whether there was sufficient
evidence to find that Savic violated the Uniform Tennis Anti-Corruption
Program (UTAP) and, if so, whether the sanction was proportionate to the
offense. After considering all the evidence, including that the phone calls
came from Savic’s telephone number, that the Skype call came from an
account named David Savic, and that the other tennis player recognized
Savic’s voice, the panel concluded that there was enough evidence to find him

52. See generally CAS 2011/A/2621.
53. Id. ¶ 4.6 (quoting the report of expert Goran Bozic) (emphasis omitted).
54. Id. ¶ 4.18.
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guilty of a corruption offense. Regarding the proportionality of the offense,
the panel adopted the Köllerer panel’s reasoning. The Köllerer panel noted
that “the sport of tennis is extremely vulnerable to corruption as a match-fixer
only needs to corrupt one player . . . . It is therefore imperative that, once a
Player gets caught, the Governing Bodies send out a clear signal to the entire
tennis community that such actions are not tolerated.”55 The CAS panel
concluded that the PTIOs’ punishment was proportionate to Savic’s corruption
offense and upheld the lifetime ban.
Sterba v. WADA56
This appeal arose from a dispute between Jan Sterba, a Czech canoeing
athlete, and WADA and regarded a suspension it imposed on Sterba. The
suspension stemmed from an AAF from Sterba’s sample taken in May 2012.
In June 2012, the International Canoe Federation (ICF) notified Sterba of the
AAF in his A sample. Following this notification, an International Canoe
Federation Doping Control Panel (ICFDCP) found Sterba guilty of a rule
violation and suspended him for a six-month period as of June 14, 2012.
Following the ICFDCP ruling, Sterba filed an appeal with the International
Canoe Federation Court of Arbitration (ICFCA), which found no anti-doping
rule violation and set aside the ICFDCP’s decision.
Sterba appealed to CAS for confirmation of the ICFCA’s decision and for
affirmation of Sterba’s eligibility to complete in the 2012 London Olympic
Games.
The respondent in this arbitration, WADA, was never a party to the initial
proceedings involving the ICFDCP or ICFCA. However, per ICF Rules
13.2.1 and 13.2.2, WADA has the right to appeal ICFDCP or ICFCA decisions
to CAS. However, WADA was not notified of Sterba’s appeal at the time
Sterba filed for this arbitration. As such, WADA contended that it lacked
standing to respond in the arbitration because it was never a party to the case.
Furthermore, WADA claimed that the ICFCA’s decision was in full affect,
and thus Sterba was eligible to compete in the 2012 London Olympic Games.
Because Sterba asked the CAS panel only to confirm the enforcement of
the ICFCA decision, the panel did not have any valid legal standing to prevent
Sterba from appearing in the 2012 Olympic Games. CAS jurisprudence
establishes that “‘only an aggrieved party, having something at stake and thus
a concrete interest in challenging a decision adopted by a sports body, may

55. Id. ¶ 8.33(vi) (quoting Köllerer / ATP & WTA & ITF & GSC, CAS 2011/A/2490).
56. See generally CAS ad hoc Division 2012/05 (O.G. London).

SURVEY FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

522

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

5/7/2013 2:37 PM

[Vol. 23:2

appeal to CAS against that decision.’”57 Because Sterba did not submit an
application against a decision, he had no legal standing to bring an appeal to
CAS; therefore, the panel found that there was no need to address the matter
further.
Swedish National Olympic Committee (SNOC) & Swedish Triathlon
Federation v. International Triathlon Union (ITU)58
In the 2012 Olympic Games women’s triathlon, Nicola Spirig won the
Olympic gold medal and Lisa Norden won the Olympic silver medal. Because
both women crossed the triathlon finish line with a time of 1:59:48, the referee
declared a winner using the official photo-finish camera. The photo “focused
on the upper bodies and heads of the athletes. Superimposed on the images
were two red vertical lines—each one marking the foremost section of the
athletes’ upper bodies at the exact time the race ended.”59 The referee
concluded that Spirig crossed the finish line first even though both athletes had
the same finish time.
The SNOC appealed the referee’s decision to the CAS ad hoc Division.
The SNOC requested a change in the rankings and that a second gold medal be
awarded to Norden. The SNOC contended that the referee’s decision as to the
winner was not a field-of-play decision; rather, it constituted a failure to apply
the ITU’s rules and was, therefore, a rule violation. The ITU argued that the
referee made a field-of-play decision and that CAS should not review the
decision unless it was arbitrary or made in bad faith.
The CAS panel noted that reviewing the referee’s decision was within its
jurisdiction, but when “there is a relevant procedure in place to resolve such
issues, the CAS ‘accepts the decision reached by this procedure as final,
except where it can be demonstrated that there has been arbitrariness or bad
faith in arriving at this decision.’”60 The CAS panel concluded that the referee
applied the correct rule, and because it found no evidence of arbitrariness or
bad faith on behalf of the referee, the panel did not review the referee’s final
field-of-play decision.

57. Id. ¶ 7.7 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).
58. See generally CAS ad hoc Division 2012/10 (O.G. London).
59. Id. ¶ 2.3.
60. Id. ¶ 7.2 (quoting Lima & Brazilian Olympic Committee / IAAF, CAS 2004/A/727, ¶ 28)
(emphasis omitted).
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Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) v. Contador & Real Federación Española
de Ciclismo (RFEC); WADA v. Contador & RFEC61
Alberto Contador Velasco (Contador) participated in the 2010 Tour de
France and was a member of ProTeam Astana. After the race’s sixteenth
stage, Contador submitted to a urine doping test under UCI Anti-Doping
Regulations. Contador’s sample tested positive for clenbuterol, a banned
substance under the WADA prohibited substances list. Contador contended
that the banned substance entered his body when he ate contaminated meat.
The Comité Nacional de Competición y Disciplina Deportiva (CNCDD)
accepted Contador’s explanation and concluded that the positive test result
was due to the contaminated meat.
The UCI appealed to CAS to issue sanctions against Contador for
violating anti-doping regulations. The UCI submitted that Contador’s claims
and evidence of contaminated meat were not sufficient to satisfy the balance
of probability standard; therefore, Contador did not meet his burden of proof.
The CAS panel stated that “it is only if the theory put forward by the Athlete is
deemed the most likely to have occurred among several scenarios, or if it is the
only possible scenario, that the Athlete shall be considered to have established
on a balance of probability how the substance entered his system . . . .”62 The
CAS panel applied this rule, found that Contador violated the anti-doping
rules, and suspended him for two years.
UCI v. Kolobnev & Russian Cycling Federation63
During the Tour de France in July 2011, Alexander Kolobnev submitted to
a doping test in France. A WADA laboratory analyzed Kolobnev’s sample,
which tested positive for hydrocholorothiazide (HCT), a banned substance
under the 2011 WADA list of prohibited substances. Kolobnev testified that
the substance entered his body as the result of taking the active food
supplement Natural kapillyaroprotector, which his doctor prescribed to treat
chronic vascular disease. The tribunal was satisfied that Kolobnev did not use
the substance with an intention to enhance his sport performance, determined
that his fault was minimal, and fined him 1,500 Swiss Francs.
The UCI filed this appeal with CAS, seeking to increase Kolobnev’s
sanctions. The issues on appeal were whether the conditions were met for the
application of a reduced sanction and whether the sanctions imposed on
Kolobnev were appropriate. Upon review, the CAS panel upheld the
61. See generally CAS 2011/A/2384 & 2386.
62. Id. ¶ 265.
63. See generally CAS 2011/A/2645.
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tribunal’s reduced sanction and found that the fine imposed without any period
of ineligibility was a proper sanction.
UCI v. Rasmussen & National Olympic Committee and Sports Confederation
of Denmark (DIF)64
This arbitration arose from the UCI’s appeal to CAS challenging the DIF
Anti-Doping Board’s decision regarding the suspension of Danish road cyclist
Alexander Rasmussen. As a member of the Danish Cycling Federation,
Rasmussen was a member of the registered testing pool since 2009, which
required him to provide regular updates to the UCI and the DIF as to his
whereabouts for drug testing purposes. In February 2010, Rasmussen could
not be found for testing and a whereabouts failure was recorded pursuant to
the Danish National Anti-Doping Rules (NADR). Later, in October 2010,
Rasmussen again failed to timely file his whereabouts information with
NADR and received another whereabouts violation. In April 2011, the DIF
was unable to locate Rasmussen for testing for a third time, which resulted in
another whereabouts testing failure. Pursuant to NADR, Rasmussen was
banned for one year from all DIF competitions, beginning on April 28, 2011,
for two violations of NADR rules. DIF cancelled the April 2011 whereabouts
testing failure because it did not notify Rasmussen within fourteen days that he
missed a test; therefore, Rasmussen was penalized for only two NADR
violations.
The UCI requested that CAS set aside the DIF’s decision and suspend
Rasmussen for a period of two years. The UCI argued that the April 2011
whereabouts testing failure met the required standards of proof to establish
that Rasmussen committed the anti-doping rule violation. This violation
would have resulted in three anti-doping rule violations in an eighteen-month
period as opposed to the two violations found by DIF. The UCI argued that
although the DIF did not notify Rasmussen within the required fourteen days,
as indicated by article 11.6.3(b) of the WADA International Standard for
Testing (IST), the IST did not apply due to the nature of the relationship
between the UCI and Rasmussen. Instead, the UCI argued that the UCI AntiDoping Rules should be applied. Unlike the IST, the UCI rules do not impose
a deadline for notification of whereabouts testing failures. Furthermore, the
UCI argued that even if the IST applied, a breach of article 11.6.3(b) was
immaterial because the rule is in place to prevent athletes from committing the
same type of error twice in a short time span, which was not the case with
Rasmussen. The UCI argued that Rasmussen violated anti-doping regulations

64. See generally CAS 2011/A/2671.
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on three separate occasions; therefore, a two-year ban was the appropriate
suspension.
Rasmussen and the DIF requested that CAS uphold the DIF suspension
because article 11.6.3(b) of the IST “‘applies regardless of explicit
implementation in the UCI [rules,]’”65 and athletes are required to comply
with WADA rules; therefore, international federations should be held to the
same standards. Rasmussen and the DIF also argued that “‘the right to be
notified within a reasonable amount of time of an alleged missed test is crucial
for an athlete’s ability to defend himself as well as his right to a speedy
trial . . . .’”66 Furthermore, Rasmussen argued that his failure to update his
address for the periodic testing was merely negligent and that he did not try to
evade doping controls; therefore, he should not be punished beyond the
minimum required period.
The central question in this arbitration proceeding was whether
Rasmussen committed three NADR violations within an eighteen-month
period. The parties agreed that the February 2010 and October 2010
whereabouts testing failures constituted NADR violations. The primary
disagreement concerned whether the April 2011 missed test constituted a third
NADR violation. This dispute centered on whether the UCI failed to comply
with IST rules regarding notifying Rasmussen within a fourteen-day period
once he was unable to be located for testing.
The CAS panel found that despite the fact that UCI did not notify
Rasmussen regarding the missed test, this did not preclude the UCI from
recording it as a missed test. The panel concluded that, although the notice of
the unsuccessful test was given past the fourteen-day window, Rasmussen was
unable to justify his failure to comply with reporting requirements. Due to the
unsatisfactory reasoning that Rasmussen provided, the CAS panel determined
that the UCI”s failure to notify Rasmussen within a fourteen-day period was
not inconsistent with respect to Rasmussen’s rights or the purposes of the rule.
Furthermore, the basis of the rule violation was that Rasmussen was not
available for the April 2011 test at the place he indicated, and the procedures
that took place after the missed test do not affect this factual basis.
Accordingly, the panel granted, in part, the appeal brought by the UCI against
the Rasmussen and the DIF. Due to Rasmussen’s anti-doping violations, the
DIF’s decision was set aside, and Rasmussen was suspended for a period of
eighteen months beginning on October 1, 2011.

65. Id. ¶ 43 (quoting WADA, International Standard: Testing art. 11.6.3(b) (2009)) (emphasis
omitted).
66. Id. ¶ 45 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).
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UCI v. Ullrich & Swiss Olympic67
In 2002, retired cyclist Jan Ullrich tested positive for amphetamines,
which qualified as banned substances under UCI and the German National
Cycling Federation (BDR) rules. The BDR suspended Ullrich for six months
as a result of his anti-doping violation. In 2004, the Spanish Guardia Civil
investigated Dr. Eufemiano Fuentes and uncovered evidence of doping
violations by several athletes including Ullrich. The Commission for the Fight
Against Doping (FDB) had jurisdiction to issue sanctions against Ullrich, but
failed to do so. In 2010, UCI appealed to CAS, requesting that CAS declare
Ullrich to have committed an anti-doping offense. The CAS panel determined
that UCI had proper authority to initiate proceedings against Ullrich despite
the fact that he resigned his UCI license. UCI argued that Ullrich engaged in
blood doping in violation of UCI’s anti-doping rules and offered evidence
from the investigation of Dr. Fuentes to support this allegation. The evidence
showed that Ullrich paid Dr. Fuentes substantial sums of money, and a DNA
analysis confirmed that Ullrich’s genetic profile matched blood bags found in
Dr. Fuentes’ possession. The CAS panel ultimately concluded that Ullrich
engaged in doping activities and declared him ineligible to participate in sports
for two years.
Ward v. International Olympic Committee (IOC) & International Boxing
Ass’n (AIBA) & Ass’n of National Olympic Committees (ANOC)68
Joseph Ward, an Irish Boxer, appealed the decision of the IOC, the AIBA,
and the ANOC that left him without the opportunity to participate in the 2012
London Olympic Games. Ward argued that the qualification process in
selecting competitors was flawed and that he should have been awarded a spot
in the 2012 Olympic Games because he was the best-placed athlete in the
AIBA rankings who had not yet qualified to compete in the Olympic Games.
The winners of the World Series of Boxing (WSB) Individual
Championships and the European Boxing Olympic Qualification Tournament
were awarded slots in the 2012 Olympic Games, but Ward did not place in
either of these competitions. Additionally, ten boxers were selected based
upon the results of the World Boxing Championships (WBC), where Ward
finished sixteenth. Following the competitions, eight slots remained open,
which were then assigned by the IOC, the AIBA, and the ANOC to boxers
who were part of National Olympic Committees (NOCs).
Ward contended that the IOC misapplied its rules by awarding a NOC spot
67. See generally CAS 2010/A/2083.
68. See generally CAS ad hoc Division 2012/02 (O.G. London).
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to a boxer from Montenegro because Montenegro did not qualify for NOC
status. NOC status is an award granted to countries with an average of six or
fewer athletes at the two preceding Olympic Games. Ward argued that
Montenegro had nineteen athletes at the 2008 Olympics as the calculation
should include the men’s water polo team. Because the Montenegrin athlete
should not have been counted, Ward argued he should have been offered a
position because he was the next best-ranked athlete who had not yet qualified.
Ward also argued that the term “ranked” referred not to the WBC results but
rather to overall competition performance.
The CAS panel found that, according to AIBA regulations, the term
“ranking” was used in an dual sense to cover both results in specific
competitions and the placement on the AIBA World Ranking System. In the
AIBA Qualification System for the 2012 Olympic Games, the rules stated that
“‘[a]ll WSB boxers will be ranked through the result of the entire WSB team
competition.’”69 Accordingly, the CAS panel found that based upon the
AIBA Qualification System, Ward was not the next best-ranked athlete;
therefore, he did not qualify for a spot regardless of the NOC status of
Montenegro.
DISABILITY LAW
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination
against those with disabilities in terms of employment, education, and access
to public services. This area of law protects not only the athletes playing in
sports but also the spectators watching sports events. Disability law imposes
compliance requirements on sports organizations and facility owners. The
following case addresses the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and how they
apply to spectators at a high school football game.
Greer v. Richardson Independent School District70
Leslie Greer was the mother of a high school football player, and she
attended her son’s football game, which led to this litigation. Unfortunately,
the football stadium was not set up to accommodate spectators in wheelchairs,
so Greer watched the game through a chain fence. Greer sued the Richardson
Independent School District for violating the ADA and Rehabilitation Act by
not providing accommodation to her during the game. The district court
granted summary motion in favor of the school district. Greer appealed, but
69. Id. ¶ 6.6 (quoting INTERNATIONAL BOXING ASSOCIATION, QUALIFICATION SYSTEM 2
(2010)) (emphasis omitted).
70. See generally 472 F. App’x 287 (5th Cir. 2012).
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the appellate court determined that Greer failed to present a prima facie case of
discrimination because the school district provided sufficient program access
to football games held at the stadium. Because the football stadium was built
in 1968, it qualified as an “existing structure” under the ADA, which only
required that the public entity “‘operate each service, program, or activity so
that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety, is readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.’”71 The appellate
court noted that Greer could park at the event, buy a ticket, purchase
concessions, and view the event in a meaningful way, so the stadium
substantially complied with the ADA. The appellate court ruled that she did
not have enough contrary evidence to dispute the school district’s evidence
that it provided adequate program access to disabled individuals who
successfully and regularly attended events. As a result, the appellate court
affirmed the district court’s decision.
DISCRIMINATION LAW
State and federal discrimination laws aim to protect one’s right to equal
treatment and prevent discrimination based on race, gender, religion, age, and
disability. Discrimination claims focus on the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, and the ADA. The following cases
demonstrate that, in the sports context, discrimination issues can affect
coaches and media providers, not just athletes.
Mollaghan v. Varnell72
John Mollaghan, John Vincent, and Ged O’Connor, all former women’s
soccer coaches for the University of Southern Mississippi (USM), brought an
action for gender discrimination and retaliation against Sonya Varnell, the
senior women’s administrator for women’s sports at USM. Mollaghan and
Vincent alleged that Varnell wanted to replace the male coaches on women’s
teams with female coaches. Additionally, O’Connor alleged that Varnell
sexually harassed him when she offered him her spare bed in her hotel room
after hearing rumors suggesting he was uncomfortable sleeping in a room with
a male roommate who may have been homosexual. At the end of the 2000
season, in which many parents and team members expressed dissatisfaction
with the coaching staff, USM did not renew Vincent’s or Mollaghan’s
contracts.
71. Id. at 291 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) (2012)).
72. See generally 105 So. 3d 291 (Miss. 2012).
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In the trial court, a jury rendered a verdict in favor of the coaches, and
Varnell appealed. On appeal, the court determined that there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury’s verdict except for in regard to O’Connor’s
sexual harassment claim. Thus, the appellate court granted a judgment
notwithstanding a verdict (JNOV) in favor of Varnell and USM on those
claims. The Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld the appellate court’s
decision to grant the JNOV in favor of Varnell and USM, but it concluded that
the appellate court erred when it denied a JNOV on the sexual harassment
claim.
TCR Sports Broadcasting Holding, L.L.P. v. FCC73
TCR Sports Broadcasting, owners of the Mid-Atlantic Sports Network
(MASN), appealed a Federal Communication Commission (FCC) decision
that declared that Time Warner was justified in declining to carry the MASN
in North Carolina. In 2006, Time Warner and Comcast Corporation bought
cable systems from Adelphia Communications Corporation. The FCC placed
several restrictions on Time Warner to prevent it from unreasonably denying
rival unaffiliated regional sports networks. MASN filed a complaint with the
FCC when Time Warner denied it carriage on Time Warner’s analog tier in
North Carolina in violation of the 1992 Cable Act. The FCC concluded that
Time Warner did not unfairly discriminate against MASN because it was
willing to carry MASN on its digital cable tier. MASN appealed the FCC’s
decision.
To overturn the FCC decision, MASN had to prove that the FCC made an
arbitrary or capricious decision. The court found that the FCC did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously in rejecting MASN’s appeal because Time Warner
provided evidence that there was not enough consumer demand for the MASN
coverage. Time Warner’s decision not to provide MASN on its analog tier
was in pursuit of legitimate business purposes. Thus, Time Warner had not
acted discriminatorily against MASN, and the FCC decision was affirmed.
EDUCATION LAW
Education law is similar to sports law in that it encompasses a wide range
of substantive areas of law and issues. Generally, education law refers to the
body of law that governs the educational system. In the sports context,
education law usually arises when student-athletes challenge the rules they are
governed by or when a school terminates a coach. Constitutional law does not
typically apply when student-athletes challenge a school, athletic association,
73. See generally 679 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 2012).
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conference, or NCAA rule. Thus, student-athletes must challenge the rule’s
application to them or challenge the rule as being arbitrary and capricious.
The case that follows demonstrates one way in which education law applies to
sports.
Wilson v. Dallas Independent School District74
Stephen Wilson taught at a school in the Dallas Independent School
District. One of his students was a student-athlete who missed a substantial
number of classes. Wilson met with the student-athlete, the student-athlete’s
parents, and administration to discuss the student-athlete’s class performance.
Following this meeting, Wilson agreed to give the student-athlete a passing
grade in the class if the student-athlete improved his class performance.
However, the student-athlete decided to drop the class. Accordingly, Wilson
changed the student-athlete’s grade to a failing grade. The next school year,
the school decided to cut the class that Wilson taught from its curriculum.
Wilson sued the school district for firing him because he believed he was fired
for reporting a No Pass, No Play violation. The district court granted the
school district summary judgment.
Under the Whistleblower Protection Act, the school district would have
waived governmental immunity if there had been an adverse personnel action
taken against Wilson for reporting the violation of the law by the school
district. The appellate court upheld the lower court’s dismissal of Wilson’s
claim because Wilson failed to demonstrate that the student-athlete
participated in any athletic event following the failing grade. Therefore, the
school district did not violate the No Pass, No Play rule and the Act did not
apply.
EMPLOYMENT LAW
Employment law governs all aspects of the employer-employee
relationship and addresses issues such as compensation, benefits,
discrimination, workplace safety, privacy, and job security. Employment laws
apply when a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) does not exist between
employers and employees. In the sports context, athletes, coaches, and league
employees use employment law to protect themselves from their employer’s
illegal actions. Courts frequently determine if a coach or others are considered
an “employee” for purposes of bringing claims under employment law
statutes. The following cases examine employment law within the sports
context.
74. See generally 376 S.W.3d 319 (Tex. App. 2012).
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Ohio ex rel. Cleveland Professional Football, LLC v. Buehrer75
Cleveland Professional Football, LLC (the New Gladiators) instigated this
action after the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation found that the New
Gladiators were a successor employer of Cleveland AFL, LLC (the Old
Gladiators). The Tenth Circuit referred this matter to a magistrate. The
magistrate agreed with the bureau’s determination that the New Gladiators
were a successor employer, which meant that the New Gladiators were
responsible for workers’ compensation claims that came from employees from
the Old Gladiators. However, the magistrate also determined that the bureau
erred in concluding that the New Gladiators assumed all of the Old Gladiators’
rate experience. Thus, the court ordered the bureau to reissue its decision on
the New Gladiators to only include that the New Gladiators were a successor
employer for the portion of the business that the New Gladiators actually
assumed.
Williams v. Smith76
The trial court found that the University of Minnesota and its head men’s
basketball coach, Tubby Smith, made a negligent misrepresentation when
Smith offered James Williams an assistant coach position without proper
authority. Minnesota and Smith appealed, arguing that they did not owe a
duty of care in an arms-length transaction with Williams because Smith only
made a verbal commitment and Williams should have known that Smith did
not have the authority to hire him.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision because
the legal relationship between Smith and Williams did not rise to the type of
relationship that would offer Williams legal protection. Williams knew that
Smith had to get approval from his supervisor prior to hiring Williams, and
they both were similarly situated businessmen negotiating at arm’s length to
maximize both of their individual interests. Thus, neither Smith nor
Minnesota owed any duty of care to Williams.
GENDER EQUITY LAW
Gender equity issues in sports often implicate Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, which has had a significant impact on sports, especially
for women at high school and college levels. In the sports context, Title IX
requires entities that receive federal funding to take certain actions so that

75. See generally No. 11AP-428, 2012 WL 6647026 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2012).
76. See generally 820 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. 2012).
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female athletes are treated equally to their male counterparts. The 1979 Title
IX Policy Interpretation and other clarifications help provide guidance to those
federally funded entities as to how to comply with Title IX.
Biediger v Quinnipiac University77
The trial court held that Quinnipiac University violated Title IX when it
miscounted its female athletes participating in track, cross-country, and
competitive cheerleading. Because competitive cheerleading was not a varsity
sport, none of the female athletes should have been counted. After
recalculating the number of female and male athletes with these considerations
taken into account, Quinnipiac had too large of a disparity between its athletes
and student population. Thus, the trial court required Quinnipiac to submit a
plan to comply with Title IX.
Quinnipiac challenged the lower court’s ruling regarding the calculation of
the indoor track and competitive cheerleading athletes and the notion that a
3.62% disparity between female athletes and the student body was sufficient to
show disproportionate athletic opportunities for females. The appellate court
upheld the trial court’s decision because lower courts are given significant
deference when interpreting Title IX, and Quinnipiac did not provide
sufficient evidence to show that female students were offered sports
participation opportunities substantially proportionate to their enrollment.
Furthermore, because the NCAA neither accepted cheerleading as a “sport”
nor an “emerging sport,” and the level of competition of Quinnipiac’s
cheerleading team did not conform to expectations of a varsity sport, the
appellate court upheld the district court’s ruling not to count cheerleaders in
determining if Quinnipiac offered substantially proportionate opportunities to
female students.
Parker v. Franklin County Community School Corp.78
Amber Parker, the mother of a high school basketball player, filed suit on
behalf of her daughter and claimed that Franklin County High School
discriminated against the girls’ basketball team in violation of Title IX. Title
IX prohibits schools that receive federal funds from discriminating against
students on the basis of gender. Parker alleged that the school discriminated
against the girls’ basketball team in regard to practice and game times and that
this discrimination caused the girls’ team to suffer academic and psychological
harm.
77. See generally 691 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2012).
78. See generally 667 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2012).
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The court stated that Parker presented an equal treatment claim under Title
IX and that the differences in the scheduling times for the teams had already
been declared to be in violation of Title IX by the Department of Education’s
Office of Civil Rights fourteen years prior. The court ruled that Parker
presented sufficient evidence of the disparity and the harm suffered by the
girls’ team, and it vacated the summary judgment ruling in favor of the school.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Intellectual property law continues to evolve and have an impact on the
sports industry. Sports entities, such as teams, leagues, schools, athletic
associations, and even athletes, seek to exploit their intellectual property rights
and protect the value of their intellectual property. Trademark, copyright,
patent, and publicity right claims significantly impact sports as merchandising,
licensing, and domain name issues become increasingly popular. The
following decisions demonstrate sports-related intellectual property issues that
arose in 2012. These decisions include those from U. S. courts and the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
Barclays Bank PLC v. Transure Enterprise Ltd.79
Barclays Bank, a financial institution active in over fifty countries, filed a
complaint with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center regarding the
domain name “barclayspremierleague.com.”
Barclays held numerous
trademarks for its brand, including the term “Barclays Premier League” in the
United Kingdom. In 2011, Transure Enterprise registered the disputed domain
name and held the domain name through a private domain service. Transure
used the domain name for a pay-per-click service that would link visitors to
other banks and financial institutions.
Barclays asserted that the domain name in dispute was confusingly similar
to the registered Barclays marks and that Transure did not have legal rights or
legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. Furthermore, Barclays noted
that due to its notoriety, Transure should have been aware of Barclays when it
registered the domain name.
The WIPO Panel examined the textual string of the disputed domain name
and found that the name was confusingly similar to the Barclays trademark.
Transure produced no evidence that it had rights or interests in the disputed
domain name. Thus, the WIPO panel ordered Transure to transfer the domain
name to Barclays.
79. See generally World Intellectual Prop. Org., No. D2012-0838 (June 1, 2012) (Bettinger,
Arb.).
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Baseball Quick, LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, LP80
Baseball Quick, LLC sued MLB Advanced Media (MLBAM) for
allegedly infringing on its patented baseball game-condensing software.
Baseball Quick provides subscribers with an edited fifteen-minute version of a
baseball game that had been played and shows the last pitch of every at-bat.
Baseball Quick’s developers filed for a provisional patent with the U.S. Patent
Office in June 2000 and were granted a patent in December 2009. In August
2000, Baseball Quick asked if MLB wanted to license the Baseball Quick
software. MLB declined to license the software on multiple occasions.
Before Baseball Quick received a patent, MLBAM developed similar gamecondensing software called Condensed Games. In its suit, Baseball Quick
alleged that MLB’s Condensed Games infringed on its patent for Baseball
Quick and sought remedies for that infringement.
MLBAM moved for summary judgment and disputed Baseball Quick’s
claim three reasons. First, MLBAM argued that Condensed Games did not
show the last pitch of every at-bat, which is an element of the Baseball Quick
program. Second, MLBAM did not charge for Condensed Games, whereas
Baseball Quick’s patent implied that its software was designed for paying
subscribers only. Lastly, MLBAM argued that to infringe upon a method
patent, MLBAM would have had to infringe on all of the patent’s method.
MLBAM argued that it did not infringe on all of the method’s steps
because several of the baseball games used in Condensed Games were
recorded before the patent was issued. The court denied summary judgment
on MLBAM’s first two arguments because there were still issues of material
fact to be decided. The court granted summary judgment on MLBAM’s final
argument because MLBAM could not have infringed on the patent by using
games recorded prior to December 2009 given that MLBAM recorded these
games, which was a step in the patent method, before the patent term
commenced.
Buday v. New York Yankees Partnership81
Tanit Buday sued the New York Yankees for copyright infringement,
alleging that the baseball club did not pay her uncle for his logo design. The
district court dismissed Buday’s complaint for a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. On review, the court of appeals
upheld the district court’s ruling but for different reasons. The court
acknowledged that Buday presented a federal question because her alleged
80. See generally No. 11 Civ. 1735(TPG), 2012 WL 1071230 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012).
81. See generally 486 F. App’x 894 (2d Cir. 2012).
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common law copyright claim would be protected under the 1976 Copyright
Act. However, the court concluded that Buday did not have a copyright
interest because the Yankees published the logo prior to the 1976 Copyright
Act. The logo was published when Buday’s uncle gave the logo to the
Yankees, and they used it on their jersey in 1947. As such, the court stated
that Buday’s common law right of first publication had when her uncle gave
consent to the Yankees to publish the logo. The court also noted that, even if
that were not the case, the logo would have been considered a work for hire
and would belong to the Yankees.
Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc.82
In 2009, the Naismith Memorial Basketball Hall of Fame inducted
Michael Jordan into its storied ranks. Sports Illustrated published a
commemorative issue of its magazine to celebrate Jordan’s accomplishment.
The magazine offered several businesses, including Jewel Food Stores, the
opportunity to design a page for the magazine that referenced Jordan. Jewel
Food operated hundreds of grocery stores in Chicago and designed a page that
displayed a pair of basketball shoes with Jordan’s number spotlighted on a
basketball floor and the company’s logo and slogan. Jordan sued Jewel Food
for making reference to him without his permission. Both Jewel Food and
Jordan sought summary judgment. Jordan specifically argued that the Jewel
Food design was an advertisement and commercial speech, and therefore, it
required less First Amendment protection.
The court stated that the speech must propose a commercial transaction to
be considered commercial speech and that Jewel Food’s page did not propose
a commercial transaction. In determining whether Jewel Food’s page
amounted to commercial speech, the court considered three factors: “whether:
(1) the speech is an advertisement; (2) the speech refers to a specific product
[or service]; and (3) the speaker has an economic motivation for the speech.”83
The court concluded that merely placing Jewel Food’s logo and slogan on the
page did not make it an advertisement, and it further noted that Jewel Food
paid no money for the page. Jordan argued that the page effectively referred
to all Jewel Food products, but the court found this argument unpersuasive.
Lastly, the court concluded that Jewel Food’s economic motivation for placing
its page in the commemorative issue did not constitute commercial speech.
Accordingly, the court granted Jewel Food’s summary judgment motion and
denied Jordan’s motion for partial summary judgment.

82. See generally 851 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
83. Id. at 1109 (quoting United States v. Benson, 561 F.3d 718, 725 (7th Cir. 2009)).
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PGA Tour, Inc. v. Paramartha84
The PGA Tour filed a trademark infringement complaint against Eka
Paramartha, an Indonesian individual. The PGA Tour owned various
trademarks revolving around the words “golf,” “world tour,” “PGA,” and
“championship,” including the phrase “world golf tour.” Accordingly, the
PGA Tour sued Paramartha for his use of the domain name “world-golf-tour.net,” which the PGA Tour argued was confusingly similar to its registered
trademark.
Upon receiving notice of the WIPO complaint, Paramartha replied by
email to the center and stated, in part, that the purpose of the not-for-profit
website was to post news, articles, and tutorials about golf and not to confuse
visitors. Paramartha indicated that he chose this domain name based upon
research done through the Google keywords research tool. Furthermore,
Paramartha stated that he immediately shut down the website upon receiving
notification of the PGA Tour’s pending action and was willing to shut down
the site and follow all rules and regulations.
The WIPO panel found that the PGA demonstrated that it owned the rights
to the mark “world golf tour” in the United States. Upon the panel’s finding
that the disputed domain name was confusingly similar to the PGA Tour’s
trademark, the panel had to determine whether Paramartha registered the
domain name in bad faith. Evidence that is used to determine if a disputed
domain name is used in bad faith includes whether: (1) the registered domain
name is used to prevent the trademark owner from using the marks; (2) the
primary purpose for registering the name is to disrupt the business of the
registered trademark owner; or (3) the disputed domain name is used
intentionally to attract internet users for commercial gain by using the likeness
of the registered trademark owner.
Paramartha noted that he was interested in the traffic that came from the
usage of the disputed domain name, which reinforced the notion that he acted
in bad faith. The panel found that Paramartha used the PGA Tour’s
trademarks in the disputed domain name without the PGA Tour’s consent. For
the forgone reasons, the panel ordered the disputed domain name be returned
to the PGA Tour.
University of Alabama Board of Trustees v. New Life Art, Inc.85
Daniel Moore painted realistic portrayals of the University of Alabama’s
84. See generally World Intellectual Prop. Org., No. D2012-1904 (Nov. 21, 2012) (Weston,
Arb.).
85. See generally 683 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2012).
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football team. Moore had painted portraits of the team since 1979, and he
eventually started making prints of the paintings for calendars, mugs, and
other items. Starting in 1991, Moore entered into several licensing agreements
with Alabama to produce and market officially licensed products. Moore
continued to produce unlicensed products as well, and Alabama did not ask
him to pay royalties on these products. In 2002, Alabama informed Moore
that he did not have permission to use Alabama’s uniforms in his products
without a license from Alabama. Moore countered that his realistic portrayal
of the past events meant that he did not need Alabama’s permission. In 2005,
Alabama sued Moore for breach of contract and trademark infringement.
The lower court concluded that Moore did not need Alabama’s consent to
portray the team’s uniforms in paintings and prints because it was a fair use,
which is protected under the First Amendment. However, the lower court
concluded that the First Amendment did not protect Moore’s use of prints on
mugs and calendars that could create consumer confusion. Both parties
appealed. The court of appeals concluded that Moore did not breach his 1995
licensing agreement because evidence showed the parties never intended “that
Moore’s portrayal of the uniforms in unlicensed paintings, prints, and
calendars would violate the licensing agreements.”86 The court noted that
several of Moore’s unlicensed paintings were displayed in Alabama’s athletic
department buildings, Alabama sold his unlicensed calendars in the school
store, and Alabama displayed several of his unlicensed paintings in the
university’s museum.
Next, the court of appeals addressed Alabama’s claims for trademark
infringement. Without deciding the strength of Alabama’s logo or the
likelihood of consumer confusion, the court determined that Moore’s works
were protected under the First Amendment. The court stated, “[T]he First
Amendment interests in artistic expression so clearly outweigh whatever
consumer confusion that might exist on these facts that we must necessarily
conclude that there has been no violation of the Lanham Act with respect to
the paintings, prints, and calendars.”87 The court explained that the use of
Alabama’s colors and trademark was necessary to produce realistic artistic
portrayals of historical events. Additionally, the court noted that Moore’s
copyright in his paintings was not “an automatic defense to any trademark
claims made by the University.”88

86. Id. at 1274.
87. Id. at 1276.
88. Id. at 1280.
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LABOR LAW
Labor law governs the relationship between employers and employees
who are unionized or are seeking to unionize. Federal labor law continues to
have a significant impact on the sports industry as each of the major U. S.
professional sports leagues is unionized. Through these unions, professional
athletes negotiate CBAs with their respective leagues. Because a majority of
American professional athletes are union members, many of the labor law
claims in sports arise out of a dispute concerning a particular sport’s CBA.
Sacco v. Cranston School Department89
Craig Sacco and Charles Pearson sued the Cranston School Department
for failing to submit their grievances regarding the loss of their coaching
positions to arbitration in accordance with the CBA between the Cranston
Teacher’s Alliance and the school district. Both coaches filed grievances
when they lost their coaching positions after receiving unfavorable reports on
their annual evaluation. The school department refused to agree to arbitration
and stated that the CBA only applied to Sacco’s and Pearson’s teaching
positions and not to their coaching positions. The court agreed with the school
department, stating that “[i]n the absence of clear language in the CBA
providing that plaintiffs—in their capacities as coaches—have a right to
submit grievances to the arbitration and grievance procedures, no such right
will be read into the contract.”90 The court also noted that coaches were not
specifically listed as “teachers” under the CBA, but other positions such as
librarians, nurses, and guidance counselors were included. The court
concluded that if the CBA permitted coaches to compel arbitration, the
coaches would have been explicitly listed under the definition of “teacher”
along with other non-teaching positions.
PROPERTY LAW
Property law concerns the rights involved with one’s interest in both real
property and personal property. Within the sports industry, property law
issues usually arise with challenges pertaining to the use of a sports facility.
These challenges include teams wanting to build a new facility as well as
zoning and nuisance issues. The following case illustrates claims related to
real property in the sports context.

89. See generally 53 A.3d 147 (R.I. 2012).
90. Id. at 150.
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Bear Creek Township v. Riebel91
John Riebel, Harold Harris, and Brian Harris owned a parcel of land.
They appealed the trial court’s order permitting Bear Creek Township’s taking
of their property for the expansion of a charter school. The township
previously approached the landowners about purchasing the property, which
was adjacent to the charter school, but was unsuccessful. After the initial
unsuccessful attempt, the township and the charter school devised a plan to
secure land for a new school building by developing recreational facilities for
township residents. The trial court ruled that the condemnation of the land
could be upheld because the development of recreational facilities was a valid
reason for the taking. The statute authorized the township to acquire lands or
buildings for recreational purposes by “lease, gift, devise, purchase or by the
exercise of the right of eminent domain for recreational purposes . . . .”92
The appeals court reversed the trial court decision and concluded that the
statute did not give the township the right to condemn land to expand the
charter school. The court found that the school construction did not serve a
recreational purpose.
SWISS FEDERAL TRIBUNAL
All CAS decisions are subject to review by the Swiss Federal Tribunal
(SFT) under Swiss law. This review usually occurs when an unhappy party
tries to vacate a CAS decision; however, this review is very limited, and the
SFT is highly deferential to CAS.
A. v. B.93
Company A, an Italian corporation, entered into a 2010 sponsorship
agreement with company B, a Spanish company who managed cycling team C
and its top cyclist, member D. In 2011, company A requested that the SFT
find in favor of terminating the sponsorship contract, but an ad hoc tribunal
rejected the request, finding that company A’s contractual obligations fell
under the 2010 agreement.
Additionally, company A requested revision of the prior decision based on
the original 2010 agreement, which was undertaken to ensure that team C, and
specifically member D, would not use any doping substances that would

91. See generally 37 A.3d 64 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012).
92. Id. at 68 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted).
93. See generally BGer, Aug. 21, 2012, docket no. 4A_750/2011 (Switz.), available at
http://www.bger.ch.
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jeopardize company A’s publicity. Company A claimed that company B
breached its duty when the Italian press published articles relating to the
opening of criminal doping proceedings against team C and member D.
During a February 2012 arbitral tribunal, the SFT found that the facts from the
newspaper articles or from the internet were not enough to prove that company
B breached its contractual duty to company A.
Company A sought further SFT review, arguing that a petitioner may seek
review of a prior award when a petitioner becomes aware of additional
relevant facts or decisive evidence that was not available in the previous
proceedings. In this case, company A presented information from the press
regarding the initiation of criminal doping proceedings against team C and
member D. Based on these media allegations, company A asserted that
company B breached its duty to supervise team C and member D, therefore,
justifying the termination of the sponsorship agreement. Company A failed to
address how the alleged opening of a criminal investigation changed the
factual findings of the February 2011 tribunal; thus, the facts alleged by
company A were not considered relevant in reversing the original SFT
decision. Accordingly, the SFT rejected the petition to annul the 2010
sponsorship agreement, and company A had to continue making payments to
company B pursuant to the agreement.
A. v. X. Federation94
A twelve-year-old Polish kart driver, whose racing club was part of the
Polish Motor Racing Federation, tested positive for an illegal substance
(Nikethamide) after placing second in a German Junior Karting Championship
race. The Polish Motor Racing Federation anti-doping committee banned the
driver from competing for two years. The driver appealed the decision to
CAS, which upheld the appeal in part but reduced the ban to eighteen months.
The driver then appealed to the SFT. The SFT noted that the driver’s racing
ban had already been lifted by the time the appeal came, which rendered his
appeal moot. The SFT further held that the driver did not offer any valid
arguments to appeal his disqualification from the race in Germany. Thus, the
SFT declined to hear the case.

94. See generally BGer, June 18, 2012, docket no. 4A_636/2011 (Switz.), available at
http://www.bger.ch.
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A. & B. v. WADA & Flemish Tennis Federation (VTV)95
VTV banned two Belgian tennis players, A and B, for one year after they
each failed to report their whereabouts in accordance with anti-doping
regulations. Both players appealed the VTV’s decision to CAS and
simultaneously appealed the decision to the Belgium state court. They further
appealed to the SFT, arguing that CAS did not have jurisdiction to sanction the
players and WADA should not be able to appeal VTV’s decision for a harsher
penalty.
On appeal to the SFT, A and B argued that CAS did not have jurisdiction
over them and that the CAS panel’s composition was irregular. The tennis
players also alleged that WADA had a conflict of interest in the case and
should not be a party. The SFT ruled that the conflict of interest claim was
groundless and refused to hear the merits of the claim. Further, the players
alleged that CAS was not independent due to its interests in the outcomes in
doping matters. The SFT did not hear the merits of this claim because the
players did not raise the issue during the arbitration proceedings; rather, they
only raised it on the appeal.
Next, the players alleged that they did not consent to arbitration, so the
CAS decision should be invalid. The VTV’s anti-doping regulations
specifically designated that CAS had jurisdiction over doping violations.
Because both of the players were members of the VTV, CAS had jurisdiction
over them whether or not Belgian law mandated it. Therefore, the SFT held
that CAS had jurisdiction to hear the players’ appeals.
The players also contended that CAS should not have accepted jurisdiction
of the WADA appeal because WADA had no interest to appeal. The players
argued that WADA was not a party to the original VTV proceedings and, thus,
should be excluded in the appeal. WADA argued that the players were
members of VTV, and as such, it did not need a specific interest to appeal the
decision. The SFT concluded that the players lost on all of their appeals and
ordered them to pay court costs.
Club X v. Club Y96
This dispute arose from the transfer of a Honduran soccer player, D, to
club X, an Italian soccer club. In 1999, club X paid club Y a transfer fee of
$2.2 million for the transfer of D. The contract stipulated that if club X
95. See generally BGer, Feb. 13, 2012, docket no. 4A_428/2011 (Switz.), available at
http://www.bger.ch.
96. See generally BGer, May 31, 2012, docket no. 4A_682/2011 (Switz.), available at
http://www.bger.ch.
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transferred D to a third party in the future, club X would pay club Y a
percentage of royalties on the transfer. If the transfer to a third party was for
less than $7 million, then club X would pay 20%, and if the transfer was for
more than $7 million, then club X would pay 15%. In 2007, club X entered
into an agreement with club L to transfer D for €14 million and, thus, owed
club Y over $2.5 million in royalties. However, club X claimed that the 1999
contract was void because it was a forgery.
Club Y filed a claim with FIFA and received a favorable judgment in 2012
ordering club X to pay the royalties. Club X appealed to CAS, but the CAS
panel upheld FIFA’s decision that the 1999 contract was valid. Club X then
appealed to the SFT, asking it to annul the arbitration award. Club X alleged
that CAS violated club X’s right to be heard because the expert looked only to
the authenticity of the signatures and not to the contract as a whole, as club X
had requested. The SFT noted that procedural issues raised on appeal would
be heard only if they were brought up during the arbitral proceeding. In this
case, club X did not allege that its due process rights were violated until after
the CAS proceeding, so the SFT rejected club X’s appeal and ordered it to pay
the costs of the hearing.
Football Ass’n of Serbia v. M.97
This SFT decision involved the appeal of a 2011 CAS decision by the
Football Association of Serbia (FAS), a member of FIFA and UEFA, and M, a
professional football coach who was a dual citizen of Spain and Serbia.
In 2008, the FAS and M entered into an employment contract for M to be
Serbia’s national football coach. After qualifying for the World Cup in 2009,
FAS and M signed a new employment contract, which spanned from January
2010 to June 2012 and stipulated that M would be paid €70,000 for the first
ten months and €100,000 for the balance of the contract. The parties also
agreed to a bonus, which was to be determined based on the performance of
the national team in the World Cup. Furthermore, the contract provided that
any dispute would fall under the jurisdiction of the FAS, UEFA, and CAS.
On July 3, 2010, FIFA banned M for four matches. Following the 2010
World Cup, the parties discussed an amendment to the 2009 contract to
provide a new compensation system. FAS offered a new amendment to the
original contract and gave M five days to accept. On the same day, M emailed
comments to the amendments to FAS. On the fifth day, FAS terminated the
coach’s employment contract without notice, citing a breach of contractual

97. See generally BGer, May 23, 2012, docket no. 4A_654/2011 (Switz.), available at
http://www.bger.ch.
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duties.
In a 2011 award, a CAS panel held that the FAS wrongfully terminated
M’s employment contract and required the FAS to pay M the net amount of
the contract (€2,150,000). The FAS appealed to the SFT, alleging improper
forum because Serbian law only permits parties to confer jurisdiction to
foreign courts if one of the parties is not a Serbian citizen. The FAS argued
that the CAS tribunal wrongly accepted jurisdiction; therefore, the CAS award
should be vacated. In the instant case, both parties were domiciled in Serbia,
as apparent from the employment contract; therefore, the submission to
foreign arbitration was improper because it was prohibited by Serbian law.
However, the SFT found that, if they overturned the award, CAS would lose
the ability to provide parties with justice in its decisions. Accordingly, the
SFT upheld the CAS award.
International Ice Hockey Federation v. SCB Ice Hockey AG98
In April 2008, the International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF) signed an
agreement with the Swiss Ice Hockey Federation (SIHF) and the Swiss
National Hockey League GmbH (NL-GmbH) to decide how Swiss clubs
would be selected to play in the Champions Hockey League. In 2009, the
Champions Hockey League’s major financial backer withdrew, which forced
it to cancel its 2009–2010 tournament. SCB Ice Hockey AG qualified for the
2009–2010 tournament, and sought CAS arbitration to recover potential prize
money and other damages relating to players purchased in anticipation of the
tournament. The Champions Hockey League Agreement stipulated that CAS
would resolve any disputes between the parties, but the agreement was only
between the IIHF, the SIHF, and the NL-GmbH. A CAS panel determined
that it had jurisdiction over the dispute. IIHF appealed this decision to the
SFT, which annulled the CAS decision.
Although the teams participating in the Champions Hockey League were
not direct parties to the contract, the CAS panel concluded that the teams that
qualified for the tournament could claim they had rights under the contract.
The IIHF disagreed with this conclusion and stated that the agreement did not
provide independent rights to teams that qualified for the tournament. The
SFT agreed with the IIHF’s interpretation of the Champions Hockey League
Agreement and annulled the CAS arbitration award that was in favor of SCB
Ice Hockey AG.

98. See generally BGer, Mar. 8, 2012, docket no. 4A_627/2011 (Switz.), available at
http://www.bger.ch.
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Matuzalem v. FIFA99
Francelino da Silva Matuzalem, a professional football player who played
for SS Lazio Spa in Rome, appealed a CAS decision that indefinitely banned
him from playing football worldwide until he paid all of the damages from the
CAS judgment. In a monumental decision, the SFT annulled a portion of the
CAS decision because the decision violated Swiss public policy.
In 2004, Matuzalem entered into an employment contract with FC
Shakhtar Donetsk that should have lasted until July 2009. In 2007, Matuzalem
terminated the contract without cause and began playing with Real Saragossa
SAD. The club agreed to hold Matuzalem harmless for possible damage
claims arising from the early termination of his contract with FC Shakhtar
Donetsk. In July 2009, Matuzalem transferred to SS Lazion Spa in Rome. In
2007, FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber ordered Real Saragossa SAD to
pay FC Shakhtar Donetsk damages of €6.8 million. Real Saragossa SAD
appealed the decision to CAS, which increased the damage award to over €11
million. Real Saragossa SAD then appealed the decision to the SFT.
The FIFA Disciplinary Code allowed for a worldwide and indefinite ban
on any football-related activity if a player fails to pay a judgment that was
entered against him. Matuzalem argued that FIFA’s indefinite ban was void
for being against public policy because the ban violated his freedom of
profession and was an excessive limitation of personal freedom guaranteed
under Swiss law. The SFT noted that actions by federations like FIFA, which
significantly harm the persons who are subject to their decisions, are
enforceable only when the federation’s decisions are justified. FIFA argued
that imposing damages against Matuzalem was meant to ensure that FIFA’s
member organizations were protected from breaches of contract. The SFT
stated that CAS’s sanctions would not achieve the purpose of getting the
damages paid because the sanctions prevented Matuzalem from playing
football and earning an income to pay the damages. Thus, the SFT annulled
the portion of the CAS decision that banned Matuzalem from playing football
because this was against public policy, but it upheld the fines against the club.
X. v. UCI & Italian National Olympic Committee (CONI) & Italian Cycling
Federation (FCI)100
The UCI created an anti-doping program called “Athlete’s Biological
99. See generally BGer, Mar. 27, 2012, docket no. 4A_558/2011 (Switz.), available at
http://www.bger.ch.
100. See generally BGer, June 18, 2012, docket no. 4A_488/2011 (Switz.), available at
http://www.bger.ch.
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Passport,” which can indirectly detect doping violations. In December 2009,
the UCI determined that X, an Italian cyclist, violated the anti-doping rules
after discovering an anomaly in his biological passport. The case proceeded to
the CONI, which overturned the UCI’s decision. X appealed to CAS to
recover attorney fees, and the UCI appealed to CAS to enforce its decision to
ban X for four years and to annul his competition results. In March 2011, a
CAS panel rejected X’s appeal, banned him from cycling for two years, and
disqualified his competition results. X appealed CAS’s decision to the SFT.
First, X argued that the CAS panel wrongly accepted jurisdiction because
UCI filed its appeal late. The SFT did not decide this claim on the merits
because it did not want to assert a definitive answer that would limit CAS’s
jurisdiction in cases with an untimely filing of an appeal.
Second, X argued that the CAS panel violated his right to be heard
because it did not address all of the arguments he submitted. The SFT ruled
that the CAS panel’s interpretations of law did not deprive X of the
opportunity to be heard, and the SFT refused to review the CAS panel’s
interpretation of law. The SFT stated that X’s allegation was really a
challenge to the facts used in the arbitration award that was disguised as an
argument concerning X’s right to be heard.
Lastly, X argued that the CAS award violated public policy because the
biological passport program, which the CAS panel used to find X guilty of
violating the anti-doping rules, was flawed. Specifically, X alleged that the
biological passport program was not based on universally accepted science
and that the program placed the burden of proof on the athlete instead of the
UCI. The SFT rejected X’s appeal because X’s questioning of the evidence
used against him had no relation to public policy.
X. v. UCI & Federation Z101
In June 2010, X, a professional cyclist, tested positive on two occasions
for the prohibited substance clomiphene. In November, Federation Z’s antidoping commission banned X for two years and fined him €7500. The UCI
inquired about the federation’s fine because article 326 of UCI’s anti-doping
regulations provides that a racer who is a member of the UCI has to pay a fine
of 70% of the cyclist’s gross income if he is suspended for at least two years
by a team registered with UCI. X made €154,000 in cycling income. The
UCI appealed to CAS and demanded that X pay a fine of €104,432.30. At the
CAS proceeding, X’s counsel opposed the selection of arbitrator Carrard by

101. See generally BGer, Oct. 9, 2012, docket no. 4A_110/2012 (Switz.), available at
http://www.bger.ch.
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the UCI and asked CAS to provide the awards of other cases decided by this
arbitrator when he was appointed by the UCI. CAS declined to provide X’s
counsel with the information because pending decisions were confidential.
In February 2012, X filed an appeal with the SFT requesting to annul the
CAS award and to disqualify Carrard as an arbitrator. X argued that Carrard
failed to disclose that the UCI appointed him as an arbitrator more than three
times within the last three years, as required by the International Bar
Assocation’s Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration.
Both the UCI and CAS argued that X’s right to object to the panel’s
composition had expired because X could only appeal the composition of the
panel at the time the panel was initially confirmed. The SFT ultimately agreed
with the UCI and CAS and determined that X forfeited his right to object to
the panel’s composition when he failed to object at the time of the
appointment or within seven days thereof.
TAX LAW
Generally, tax law involves the rules that regulate federal and state
taxation, which are derived from the U.S. Constitution, statutes, and common
law. Many of the sports law cases in the tax law area involve the income tax
filings of a coach, referee, or player as evidenced by the cases below, which
center on whether such individuals may deduct certain expenses from their
income.
Mauer v. Commissioner of Revenue102
Kenneth Mauer, a National Basketball Association (NBA) referee,
appealed the Tax Commissioner’s order that he was a Minnesota resident for
the 2003 tax year. Mauer alleged that a provision under the Residency Rule
violated the Commerce Clause and his Equal Protection rights under federal
and state law. The issue arose from the NBA’s airline ticket refund policy that
required the refunds to be reported as income. In 2003, Mauer informed the
NBA that he changed his primary address from Minnesota to Fort Myers,
Florida. Therefore, Fort Myers would be considered his “home city” when he
booked flights to and from basketball games that he refereed. Despite the
change, Mauer continued to fly primarily in and out of Minnesota, and the
NBA expressed concern about his travel arrangements. The court upheld the
commissioner’s decision and ruled that Mauer was a Minnesota resident for
tax purposes because he maintained a home in Minnesota and conducted most
of personal business there. The court also ruled that the provision in
102. See generally No. 8117, 2012 Minn. Tax LEXIS 7 (Minn. T.C. Jan. 20, 2012).
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Residency Rule did not violate the Commerce Clause or the Equal Protection
provisions of the federal or state constitutions.
Parks v. Commissioner103
The sole issue on review in this case was whether John Parks’s coaching
activity as a track coach amounted to an “activity not engaged in for profit”
under Internal Revenue Code section 183.104 Under section 183, a person
cannot deduct expenses for activities in which the person does not act to make
a profit. The court found that Parks’s coaching activity was an activity for a
profit because he approached coaching in a businesslike manner and spent
considerable time coaching. Thus, he could list his losses related to his
coaching on his tax returns.
Sernett v. Commissioner105
The sole issue on review in this case was whether John Sernett’s sprint car
racing activity amounted to an “activity not engaged in for profit” under
Internal Revenue Code section 183.106 The court determined that Sernett’s
sprint car racing was not an activity for profit because he did not rely on the
racing for his income, was not invested in the racing in a businesslike manner,
and his racing appeared to be recreational. Thus, he could not claim his losses
on his tax returns.
TORT LAW
Tort law continues to represent the most litigated area in sports law. Tort
law governs the duty of care owed to co-participants in athletic events,
spectators, and those using sports facilities. When determining whether to
impose liability, courts balance those risks that are inherent to the sport with
the degree of safety owed to the co-participants, spectators, and others using
the sports facility.
Bocelli v. County of Nassau107
John Bocelli fell on an exposed sprinkler head on a field owned by the

103.
2012).
104.
105.
106.
107.

See generally No. 21600-11S, 21602-11S, T.C. Summ. Op. 2012-105 (T.C. Oct. 25,
Id. at *3 (quoting I.R.C. § 183(c) (2006)).
See generally 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 703 (T.C. 2012).
Id. at *4 (quoting I.R.C. § 183(c)).
See generally 940 N.Y.S.2d 600 (App. Div. 2012).
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County of Nassau during a flag football game. The lower court found that
Bocelli assumed the risk of injury by participating in the football game and
granted the county’s motion for summary judgment.
The owner of a facility is immune from liability if an athlete suffers an
injury due to a field defect or feature if the risk of injury is inherently part of
the sport. This doctrine of immunity applies when “the playing surface is as
safe as it appears to be, and the condition in question is not concealed such
that it unreasonably increases risk assumed by the players . . . .”108 On appeal,
the court overturned the summary judgment order because the county failed to
demonstrate that the risk of injury from a sprinkler head on the field was an
inherent risk of playing flag football. Previous courts have found that
sprinkler heads could be inherent risks of sport, but the county failed to offer
enough evidence to lead to such a conclusion in this case. Accordingly, the
court remanded the case to the lower court for further review.
Brabson v. Floyd County Board of Education109
The plaintiff, Carey Brabson, was a spectator at a cheerleading event when
she tripped on the raised gymnasium floor. Cheer Elite, a privately owned
company, organized the cheerleading competition. Prestonburg High School
in Floyd County held this specific competition, and the cheerleading team’s
booster club managed the competition. However, the Floyd County Board of
Education did not receive any profits, and no school board personnel were
present during the competition.
Following her injury, Brabson sued both the board of education and Cheer
Elite’s owner, alleging that the defendants failed to properly warn invitees of
the dangerous floor conditions that caused her injury. The court granted Cheer
Elite summary judgment because the company did not own the gymnasium
and, therefore, was immune from liability. The board of education also moved
for summary judgment on the basis of governmental immunity. To be entitled
to governmental immunity, the board must have acted in a governmental
capacity.
The court examined the board of education’s relationship with the booster
club and found that, by allowing the competition to take place on school
grounds, the board acted in a governmental capacity to further education. The
board of education did not receive compensation for the rental of the
gymnasium, which indicated that it did not act in a proprietary manner. The

108. Id. at 662 (quoting Cotty v. Town of Southampton, 880 N.Y.S.2d 656, 659 (App. Div.
2009)).
109. See generally 862 F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D. Ky. 2012).
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court permitted the governmental immunity defense and granted summary
judgment to the board of education.
Cope v. Utah Valley State College (UVSC)110
Shawnna Rae Cope sued UVSC after she was injured during a practice
session while participating on the Ballroom Dance Tour Team. The team’s
instructor pointed out that Cope and her partner were performing a lift
incorrectly and told them that, if they did not get the lift right, they would have
to cut it from their routine. While practicing the lift, Cope’s partner lost his
footing and dropped her, causing her to suffer head trauma. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of UVSC, stating that neither the college
nor the instructor had a special relationship with Cope, nor did they owe her a
duty of care. The court noted that universities and colleges typically do not
owe students any duty of care, except under certain circumstances when a
special relationship is formed that would create a duty of care on the part of
the school. A “special relationship is created when (1) a directive is given to a
student (2) by a teacher or coach (3) within the scope of the academic
enterprise.”111 Applying this test, the appellate court concluded that a special
relationship existed and that the instructor owed Cope a duty of reasonable
care. Therefore, the court reversed the summary judgment in favor of UVSC
and remanded the case.
Creel v. L & L, Inc.112
This case was an appeal of a ruling that granted summary judgment to
owners of a golf course, L & L, Inc., after a golf ball struck James Creel, a
spectator, in the head while he was standing near one of the holes. The golfer
who hit Creel saw Creel and other golfers on the putting green but chose to hit
his golf ball after an L & L employee instructed him to do so. The lower court
granted L & L’s motion for summary judgment because Creel assumed the
risk of a golf ball hitting him, and the Wyoming Recreational Safety Act bars
actions against providers of recreational opportunities from injuries caused by
an inherent risk of the activity. Furthermore, the Act states, “‘A provider of
any sport or recreational opportunity is not required to eliminate, alter or
control the inherent risks within the particular sport or recreational
opportunity.’”113
110.
111.
112.
113.

See generally 290 P.3d 314 (Utah Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 320 (citation omitted).
See generally 287 P.3d 729 (Wyo. 2012).
Id. at 734 (quoting WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-123(b) (LexisNexis 2011)).
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Creel argued that L & L’s agent negligently increased the risk of injury to
the spectators by instructing the golfer to hit his ball, an action that removed
the protection afforded by the Act. Creel’s central claim was that L & L
negligently trained its employee, which resulted in the employee instructing
the golfer to hit the ball when it was not safe to do so, and ultimately caused
Creel’s injury.
The Act defines inherent risk as the “‘dangers or conditions which are
characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of any sport or recreational
opportunity.’”114 The court clarified that an inherent risk may not be selfevident, and risks may occur from a choice made by a provider in specific
instances that the legislature intended to exempt. The court ultimately
reversed the summary judgment order because there was evidence that the
employee’s failure to heed the golfer’s warning that he could hit spectators
could constitute negligence.
DeAtley v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.115
Kalee DeAtley, a senior in high school, participated on his school’s
wrestling team. The team qualified for the Missouri State Wrestling
Tournament, but DeAtley did not qualify individually to compete. However,
DeAtley was permitted to accompany the team to the tournament. While at
the team’s hotel, DeAtley was acting foolishly with other members of the team
who did not qualify for the tournament, and he ruptured his spleen. DeAtley
sought to be covered under the insurance policy that was issued to the
Missouri State High School Activities Association (MSHSAA) for the
tournament. The insurance company refused to pay because DeAtley did not
participate in the tournament, as defined in the insurance policy. The policy
defined eligible students to be “‘[a]ll student athletes, student managers,
student trainers, student cheerleaders[,] and students participating in
interscholastic competition.’”116 DeAtley argued that the policy should have
covered him because he was traveling as a student-athlete with the team to the
covered event, and he was participating in the tournament by virtue of
attending with the team. The court disagreed and stated that “DeAtley’s only
role at the tournament was as a spectator, and thus he was not participating in
the wrestling tournament as a student athlete.”117 The appellate court affirmed
the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to Mutual of Omaha.

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. (quoting § 1-1-122(a)(i))
See generally 701 F.3d 836 (8th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 838 (citation omitted).
Id. at 839–40.
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DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC118
Michelle DiPietro was a minor child who was playing soccer at
Farmington Sports Arena and injured her ankle when her foot stuck to the
playing surface while running. Her mother sued Farmington Sports Arena for
negligence, claiming that the playing surface was unsafe. Prior to DiPietro’s
injury, no standards had been set for regulating the playing surfaces of indoor
soccer facilities. Farmington Sports Arena used carpet similar to that used by
other indoor soccer facilities, and the Connecticut Junior Soccer Association
had approved the facility and the carpet after an inspection.
The standard for negligence was that the Farmington Sports Arena owed a
duty to DiPietro, and it had to have had actual or constructive notice of the
unsafe playing condition before liability would apply. Specifically, the notice
had to be related to the actual defect in the playing surface. To prove
negligence, DiPietro’s mother had the responsibility to prove that Farmington
Sports Arena had such notice of the defect and that the arena failed to rectify
the defect upon such notice. Given that there was no notice of the unsafe
playing surface prior to the injury, the court found for Farmington Sports
Arena on summary judgment, and DiPietro lost her case.
Layden v. Plante119
Diane Layden sued her personal trainer, Angela Plante, and the owner of
No Limits Fitness, Deborah Greenfield, after Layden injured herself while
exercising under Plante’s direction. Plante instructed Layden to stop
exercising after Layden herniated a disc in her back, but Layden continued
exercising on her own using Plante’s written instructions. Layden herniated
two more of her discs. Layden then alleged that Plante failed to supervise and
instruct her and that Greenfield negligently trained Plante. Layden appealed
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Greenfield and Plante. Since
Layden had weight-lifting experience and knew that she could injure her back,
the appellate court found that she assumed the risk of injury. However, the
appellate court remanded the case for the jury to decide whether Plante created
unreasonable progression of those risks beyond normal weight-lifting risks.
Leasure v. Adena Local School District120
Heidi Leasure sued Adena Local School District for its negligent

118. See generally 49 A.3d 951 (Conn. 2012).
119. See generally 957 N.Y.S.2d 458 (App. Div. 2012).
120. See generally 973 N.E.2d 810 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012).
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configuration, installation, and maintenance of bleachers in a high school
gymnasium. Leasure was watching a volleyball game in the gymnasium when
she fell while walking down the bleacher steps. The district court denied
summary judgment as the condition of the bleachers was an issue of material
fact.
The school district argued that the court should have granted it immunity
because the injury occurred on the school grounds in a gymnasium that was
used for a governmental purpose. However, the issue in the case, which
Leasure had to prove, related to whether the physical defect in the bleachers—
that they were not operating as intended—caused Leasure’s injury. Leasure
offered evidence that demonstrated that the bleachers did not operate as
intended because they shifted while people were walking on them. Further,
the bleachers were not set up according to the manufacturer’s specifications.
The appellate court affirmed the denial of summary judgment because there
was a question of material fact as to whether the bleachers were safe and
operating properly.
Leja v. Community Unit School District 300121
Allison Leja sued Community Unit School District 300 after she was
injured during a high school volleyball practice. Leja suffered facial injuries
when the volleyball net crank that she was adjusting snapped back and struck
her. After the trial court concluded that the school district was immune from
suit, Leja appealed. On appeal, she argued that the school district had notice
of the volleyball net crank’s risk of injury because there was a warning label
on the crank; by allowing Leja to operate the crank with the warning label still
on it, the school district showed disregard for her safety. To prove the school
district had notice and acted with disregard for her safety, Leja had to prove
that the school district knew that she was likely to suffer an injury by
operating the crank. The court found that the warning label itself did not
constitute notice of such a likelihood of injury, and Leja lost her appeal.
Marcus v. City of Newton122
Edward Marcus brought suit alleging that the City of Newton negligently
maintained a softball field because he was injured when a tree fell on him as
he was awaiting his turn to bat during a recreational softball game. The city
argued that it was entitled to summary judgment under the recreational
immunity doctrine. The superior court denied summary judgment to the city,
121. See generally 979 N.E.2d 573 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
122. See generally 967 N.E.2d 140 (Mass. 2012).
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and the city appealed.
The recreational use statute provides that anyone “‘having an interest in
land . . . who lawfully permits the public to use such land for recreational . . .
[activities] . . . shall not be liable for personal injuries . . . sustained by such
members of the public . . . in the absence of willful, wanton, or reckless
conduct by such person.’”123 Furthermore, the statute provides that when a
landowner charges a fee, so long as that fee is used for the sole purpose of
reimbursing costs directly attributable to a user’s specific recreational use, the
landowner still remains exempt from liability.
In this case, Marcus paid an $80 registration fee to the organizers of the
softball league, Coed Jewish Sports, who in turn paid the city a fee to secure a
permit to use the field for purposes of the softball league. Although the city
claimed that it used the fee for maintenance and administrative costs
associated with the field, the city did not present evidence to support that the
payment was dedicated solely to the costs directly attributable to the city’s
maintenance of the field. The appellate court found that the lower court
properly denied the city’s motion for summary judgment.
Sams v. College Bowl Lanes, Inc.124
Lou Sams suffered an injury by slipping while bowling at a bowling alley
owned and operated by College Bowl Lanes, Inc. Sams alleged the bowling
alley negligently applied oil to the bowling lane, which caused excess oil to
collect in the area where Sams stepped and resulted in her injury. The trial
court granted summary judgment to College Bowl Lanes on the grounds that it
did not breach its duty to exercise ordinary care regarding the maintenance of
the bowling lane and that Sams’s claim was based on mere speculation.
To establish negligence, Sams had to prove that the bowling alley owed
her a duty of care, that it breached that duty, and that the breach was a direct
and proximate cause of her injury. It is undisputed that Sams was a business
invitee; therefore, the bowling alley owed her a duty to maintain the premises
of the bowling alley in reasonably safe manner. Sams failed to provide
evidence showing that the bowling alley breached this duty of care. As a
result, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary
judgment for College Bowl Lanes.

123. Id. at 143 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 21, § 17C (2010)).
124. See generally No. 2011CA00138, 2012 WL 134832 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2012).
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Sandholm v. Kuecker125
This case was an appeal regarding the applicability of the Citizen
Participation Act to a lawsuit alleging multiple accounts of defamation per se.
Steve Sandholm, a high school athletic director and basketball coach, alleged
that fans of the basketball team defamed him by attempting to remove him as
the head coach. In particular, Sandholm claimed that the fans wrote emails to
the school board, commented in the local newspapers, and made website
publications with malice and reckless disregard for the truth.
The fans filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that SLAPP (Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation) prohibited such a defamation claim
because the claim was based on their right to free speech with the purpose of
procuring a favorable governmental action to fire the coach. The district court
agreed and dismissed the claim. However, the appellate court found that the
statements were not furthering free speech. Sandholm had a right to seek
damages for the harm he suffered due to the defamatory statements. The
appellate court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.
Smith v. Landfair126
Roshel Smith sued Donald Landfair in a personal injury action after
sustaining injuries from one of Landfair’s horses that was spooked while being
unloaded from a horse trailer. Smith argued that Landfair negligently handled
his horse when removing the horse from the trailer based on the horse’s known
temperament. The appellate court concluded that Smith was neither an equine
activity participant nor a spectator; thus, Landfair was liable for Smith’s
injury.
However, the Ohio Supreme Court overturned the appellate court’s
finding that Smith was not an equine activity participant because Smith placed
herself in the horse stable where equine activity was occurring. The case was
remanded back to the circuit court.
Steinbrink v. Greenon Local School District127
Tad Steinbrink, a high school teacher and assistant football coach, sued
the Greenon Local School District for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, defamation per se, libel, and tortious interference with a contract.
Steinbrink was investigated for his conduct as an assistant football coach and

125. See generally 962 N.E.2d 418 (Ill. 2012).
126. See generally 984 N.E.2d 1016 (Ohio 2012).
127. See generally No. 11CA0050, 2012 WL 1080735 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2012).
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was asked to resign from his position as coach. However, Steinbrink claimed
that he did not have notice of the investigation and that the school district
made damaging statements about his termination to the local newspaper.
The school district filed for judgment on the pleadings; it argued that there
was no actionable claim of relief available and that the school district was
immune from liability pursuant to the Ohio Code that provides immunity for
political subdivisions and their employees against civil damages. However,
the immunity for political subdivisions did not apply to matters arising out of
an employment relationship between the school district and its employees.
Further, Steinbrink’s claims involved intentional conduct, which also
prevented the governmental immunity defense. Thus, the appellate court
denied the judgment on the pleadings.
Stern v. Easter128
A golf ball struck Rachel Stern while she was at Guy Easter’s golf course.
Stern then sued Easter, seeking damages for the injuries she sustained. Stern
had been sitting on a patio next to the golf course when an errant tee shot hit
her. Easter introduced evidence to show that, in the fifteen years that the golf
course had operated near the area Stern was seated, only two golf balls had
ever struck the building, landing in areas at least seventy-five feet from where
Stern was seated.
Although a property owner owes a duty to exercise reasonable care in
preventing foreseeable injuries to individuals on adjoining properties, there
was no duty to protect against occurrences extraordinary in nature. The
evidence presented showed no indication that the occurrence in this case was
foreseeable to Easter. The court found that the golf ball that hit Stern “was an
extraordinary occurrence that a reasonably prudent golf course owner would
not be expected to guard against[,]”129 and the court dismissed the complaint.
Wolfe v. AmeriCheer, Inc.130
Lindsay Wolfe was injured during an AmeriCheer cheerleading
competition. She was on a private all-star cheerleading team and was the base
during a cheerleading stunt, where she lifted another cheerleader (the flyer)
into the air. During a lift, the flyer lost her balance and fell on Wolfe. Wolfe
sued AmeriCheer for recklessly failing to provide spotters, which she claimed
caused her injury.
128. See generally 92 A.D.3d 1250 (N.Y. App. Ct. 2012).
129. Id. at 1252.
130. See generally No. 11AP-550, 2012 WL 760778 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2012).
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Prior to participating in the competition, Wolfe’s mother signed a release
waiver that stated that Wolfe understood she could be injured, that she
assumed full risk of such potential injury, and that she released AmeriCheer
from liability for any injuries. AmeriCheer moved for summary judgment
because of this release waiver; it also argued that Wolfe assumed the risk of
injury under the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. The trial court
granted summary judgment to AmeriCheer based on these claims.
On appeal, Wolfe argued that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment due to material facts that Wolfe presented showing AmeriCheer’s
reckless conduct, which barred the waiver and the assumption of risk
argument. To establish willful, reckless, or wanton conduct on the part of
AmeriCheer, Wolfe had to show that AmeriCheer failed to exercise its duty of
care in a situation where there was a high probability of harm that could result
from the lack of care. At the time of the accident, AmeriCheer was under no
duty to provide spotters, but it provided them anyway as a safety precaution.
Additionally, there was no evidence that the spotters in this case were
negligent. The appellate court found that there was no evidence suggesting
that AmeriCheer acted with a reckless disregard to the safety of the
participants, and the court upheld the trial court’s order of summary judgment.
U. S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY
The U. S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) is the United States’ antidoping organization. The non-profit organization manages the anti-doping
program for various athletes, including those in the U.S. Olympic and PanAmerican programs. USADA addresses positive drug tests for those athletes
and imposes sanctions based on specific procedures. The decisions that follow
demonstrate the anti-doping situations that involved USADA during 2012.
Chelsea Football Club Ltd. v. Mutu131
FIFA temporarily banned Adrian Mutu from playing worldwide soccer
because he tested positive for cocaine in 2004. In 2009, a CAS panel upheld
FIFA’s ruling. Chelsea Football Club filed a petition to recognize and enforce
the CAS decision to suspend Mutu pursuant the New York Convention. The
court upheld the suspension because the rationale used by the CAS panel in
calculating damages paid to Chelsea did not violate U.S. public policy.

131. See generally 849 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
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USADA v. Arias132
Luis Arias, a middleweight boxer registered with USA Boxing, contested
USADA’s declaration of his third whereabouts failure in eighteen months.
Arias claimed that he was not negligent in his failure to file a timely
whereabouts notice and that the situation was beyond his control. Arias’s
coping control manager testified that USADA sent Arias four emails at the
email address Arias provided and a voicemail message notifying him of the
importance of his timely filing. Arias contended that he was busy with his
college finals and was working with his lawyers and promoters to decide
whether he was going to turn professional, which caused his late filing. Arias
then stated that he could not log on to his USADA account because of a
password problem and that he tried to call the USADA office, but USADA
closed the office for the holidays. USADA presented evidence that its offices
were open for three days between December 27 and December 29, that its call
logs did not show any calls from Arias, and that it had called Arias during the
last week of December to remind him of his whereabouts filing. The arbitrator
noted that Arias had experience with properly making whereabouts filings, had
received training, and knew of the consequences of failing to file adequately;
thus, the arbitrator ruled that Arias was negligent in not filing his whereabouts
and denied his appeal.
USADA v. Hellebuyck133
In 2004, USADA cited Eddy Hellebuyck for a doping violation and
suspended him for two years. In a 2010 interview with Runner’s World
Magazine, Hellebuyck admitted that he used erythropoietin (EPO), a banned
substance. In October 2010, Hellebuyck contacted the chief executive officer
of USADA to admit that he used EPO as early as 2001. Hellebuyck conceded
that he had perjured himself in his 2004 arbitration hearing and his 2006
appeal to CAS when he claimed he had never used EPO prior to his positive
test in 2004. On April 27, 2011, USADA sent Hellebuyck a charging letter,
which informed him that USADA would be modifying his previous doping
violation. Hellebuyck disputed USADA’s ability to do this based on IAAF
rule 55.2(iii), which provides that USADA cannot use stated admissions
against an athlete if the violation occurred over six years ago. USADA argued

132. See generally Am. Arbitration Ass’n: N. Am. CAS Panel, AAA No. 77 190 E 00043 12
JENF (Mar. 27, 2012); Am. Arbitration Ass’n: N. Am. CAS Panel, AAA No. 77 190 E 00042 12
JENF (Feb. 25, 2012).
133. See generally Am. Arbitration Ass’n: N. Am. CAS Panel, AAA No. 77 190 168 11 JENF
(Jan. 30, 2012).
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that the statute of limitations had been tolled by Hellebuyck’s fraudulent
concealment at his 2004 hearing and that it could invalidate his results as early
as his first admitted violation in 2001.
The panel ruled that the IAAF rule applied to Hellebuyck and that the
statute of limitations had passed for USADA to use his admission against him.
However, the panel also acknowledged the unclean hands doctrine, which
states that those who “ask for help about the actions of someone else but have
acted wrongly . . . may not receive the relief [they] seek.” 134 The panel
decided that Hellebuyck came with unclean hands when he “admitted he
committed multiple doping offenses during the relevant time period that he
lied about in the 2004 hearing . . . .”135 Further, the panel stated that
Hellebuyck could not “assert that some procedural or substantive rule
designed for the purpose of ensuring the adequate presentation of timely and
reliable evidence should work to his benefit to avoid a determination that he
committed the doping offense.”136
The panel ultimately ruled that
Hellebuyck’s false testimony tolled the statue of limitations until his
admission to USADA in 2010, and the panel’s holding invalidated his results
back to 2001.
USADA v. Jelks137
Mark Jelks, a track and field athlete, appealed USADA’s decision to
suspend him for two years following his failure to file three whereabouts
filings within an eighteen-month period. The suspension began on August 23,
2010, but Jelks did not file his appeal until after he had already served half of
his ineligibility period. He then contacted USADA to request a reduction in
his suspension and gave the reasoning for his whereabouts failures. The
reasoning helped to justify his failures and could have resulted in a less severe
suspension had he communicated it to USADA at an earlier date.
Jelks argued that his case should have been reopened “based on general
principals of law and in the interest of justice.”138 Jelks wanted to present
evidence to USADA that he was unable to respond to its notices because he
was severely depressed after his dad died, he lost his mentor, he had a child
with his girlfriend, and he lost his means of income and home, all causing him
to act unreasonably. USADA argued that section 11(e) of the USADA
134. Id. ¶ 8.3.
135. Id. ¶ 8.8.
136. Id.
137. See generally Am. Arbitration Ass’n: N. Am. CAS Panel, AAA No. 77 190 00074 12
(May 23, 2012).
138. Id. ¶ 6.1.
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Protocol prohibits a judgment from being reopened unless the athlete can show
that he failed to receive proper notice or the opportunity to contest the
sanction; Jelks had already conceded that he received proper notice.
The issues at arbitration were whether there was a legal basis for reducing
the suspension and whether Jelks’ fact scenario merited a reduction.
Typically, athletes only have fifteen days to appeal a sanction. Jelks
contended that he was unable to object to the sanction in time because he was
so severely depressed that he could not act as a reasonable person would. The
arbitrator noted that Jelks had contested his second missed test and submitted a
written appeal. The arbitrator also stated that Jelks had several people to
whom he could reach out and that he managed to find time to compete and
train. Finally, the arbitrator found that not a single doctor diagnosed Jelks as
being clinically depressed, and Jelks did not present any evidence to prove
such a diagnosis. Thus, the arbitrator concluded that there was no reason to
reduce Jelks’s suspension from two years to one and denied his appeal.
U. S. OLYMPIC COMMITTEE
The U. S. Olympic Committee (USOC) is the national Olympic committee
for the United States, which supports American and Olympic athletes. The
USOC supervises the national governing bodies for the various Olympic
Sports. The USOC also protects and develops the Olympic Movement in the
United States and is the United States’ representative for Olympic matters.
The following decisions represent the major issues relating to the USOC and
its authority during 2012.
DeRosier v. USA Track & Field (USATF)139
Phil DeRosier and Amanda Kimbers, two American track and field
athletes, challenged a USATF ruling that denied the record times they ran on
June 16, 2012, at the New Jersey International Invitational meet to qualify
them to compete at the 2012 U.S. Olympic Trials. At the meet, both athletes
achieved personal best times that met the USATF qualifying standards for the
trials, but the USATF later determined that the timing devices used did not
conform to USATF timing standards. Subsequently, the USATF decided to
not accept the time, and the athletes were not able to compete in the trials.
The U.S. Olympic Trials rules require that the video-based timing systems
have to use devices that produce at least fifty frames per second and
incorporate a timing device that reads up to 1/110 of a second. USATF failed
139. See generally Am. Arbitration Ass’n: N. Am. CAS Panel, AAA No. 77 190 E 00189 12
JENF (June 22, 2012).
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to prove that the New Jersey meet timing devices did not comply with
regulations. Thus, the athletes were able to use their recorded times at the
New Jersey meet to compete in the trials.
Guarnier v. USA Cycling, Inc. (USAC)140
Megan Guarnier, an American cyclist who competed for a position on the
2012 Olympic Cycling Team and sought to be named a member of the
Olympic team in the road-cycling event, brought a complaint against USAC.
The complaint alleged that USAC misapplied and failed to follow its own
established athlete selection procedures when it selected a specific member to
the Olympic team instead of Guarnier.
USAC procedures define the discretionary criteria for selection to the road
team in the following manner: (1) Medal Capability—the first and foremost
requirement is that the selected athlete demonstrate he or she is capable of
medaling in Olympic style events; (2) Capability of Enhancing Team
performance—the athlete, based upon international experience and
performance, must be able to contribute primarily to “the synergy of the team
members and/or the ability to play a strong support role [in] . . . the success of
the team[;]”141 and (3) Future Medal Capability. Guarnier asserted that neither
she nor the specific member of the team she wanted to replace were medal
capable, but she claimed that she would have been better able to assist the
team as a support rider than the selected member. Guarnier relied on the
wording in the selection criteria that there is a primary importance on being
able to assist in the success of the team, arguing that her qualities as a support
rider were far superior to those of the team member she was looking to
replace. Guarnier, although qualified to be a support rider, was not medal
capable. Alternatively, the rider Guarnier sought to replace was possibly
medal capable, but she was not a proven support rider.
Due to the discretionary nature of the USAC selection criteria, the
arbitrator found that USAC properly applied its selection criteria by choosing
a medal capable member over a non-medal capable support rider. Therefore,
the arbitrator dismissed Guarnier’s claim and left the team originally selected
by the USAC intact.

140. See generally Am. Arbitration Ass’n: N. Am. CAS Panel, AAA No. 77 190 E 00198
JENF (July 9, 2012).
141. Id. ¶ VIII(B)(2.1).
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Merson v. USA Triathlon (USAT)142
Melissa Merson alleged that USAT failed to follow its procedure for
nominating candidates to serve on the International Triathlon Union Executive
Board (ITU Board). Merson had governed triathlons for over twenty years
and served on the USAT Board of Directors, with per of her time
compromising the role of chair of the USAT International Relations
Committee (USAT IRC). In 2008, Merson started a four-year term as the
United States’ representative to the ITU Board, where she performed various
tasks including evaluating rule changes and serving on competition juries.
In 2012, a member of the USAT Board solicited candidates to run against
Merson and convinced a fellow board member to run for the position. Further,
the board member who replaced Merson did not submit her nomination to the
USAT IRC, as was requested, but instead, the member directly informed the
president of her interest in the position. The USAT Board then held a meeting
to vote on the nominations to the ITU Board. At the meeting the USAT Board
did not vote for any of the recommended candidates, but it chose two of the
nine open positions, including the Merson’s position, to be open for a special
discussion and a vote. During discussion, members spoke in favor of Merson
and indicated that ITU executive officers had specifically requested Merson’s
renomination. Despite strong endorsements, the USAT Board did not vote to
renominate Merson and instead nominated an individual with less experience
who lacked support from the USAT athlete board. Subsequently, the athlete
board members made a motion to reconsider the nomination, but it failed.
Upon the motion’s failure, athlete board members filled a complaint based
upon the failure of the USAT Board to nominate a candidate who represented
the views of the athlete board and the USAT IRC. Thereafter, the USAT
Board nominated another highly respected businesswoman who could conduct
sound international relations for Merson’s desired position.
The arbitrator’s de novo review of Merson’s claims required her to carry
the burden of proving the claim by a preponderance of the evidence. To
succeed, Merson had to prove one of four factors: (1) the selection was not in
accordance with the USAT’s selection policy; (2) USAT misapplied the
policy; (3) the decision maker showed bias or the selection process was
demonstrably unfair; or (4) the decision was unreasonable. “So long as [the
USAT] decision is the product of applying their policy and process as
published, fairly and in good faith without the presence of the disqualifying
factors . . . , for a proper purpose . . . , then that decision will be accorded

142. See generally Am. Arbitration Ass’n: N. Am. CAS Panel, AAA No. 77 190 00272 12
JENF (Oct. 12, 2012).
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utmost respect . . . .”143
Merson asserted that the USAT Board retaliated against her for expressing
unpopular views regarding the operation of a USAT branch at a prior board
meeting, and as a result, she was not reelected to her position on the ITU
Board. Conversely, USAT asserted that the reason the USAT Board did not
renominate Merson was partly because of her prior inappropriate conduct at
past events where she was a representative of USAT and because of her
negative position expressed at previous meetings. Further, the USAT Board
did not have to adopt athlete boardmembers or USAT IRC recommendations.
The USAT Board may use its discretion when electing representatives.
Accordingly, the arbitrator found that the USAT Board had the express power
to elect any individual that is qualified for the position, as it did in this case.
Morgan & Theriault v. USA Synchronized Swimming (USA Synchro)144
Olivia Morgan and Michele Theriault appealed USA Synchro’s decision
to keep Morgan from competing in the 2012 London Olympics with Theriault.
Morgan and Theriault alleged that USA Synchro failed to follow its own
established athlete selection procedure by choosing Theriault and pairing her
with another swimmer, while USA Synchro selected Morgan as an alternate.
Specifically, Morgan and Theriault stated the following: (1) USA Synchro did
not follow its own procedures when it failed to give the required weight to the
fitness evaluations during the selection process; (2) the director of the national
team had a direct conflict of interest with the selection; and (3) the selection
did not look at pairs as a duet but, rather, as individuals. Morgan declined the
invitation to serve as the alternate. Ultimately, Morgan and Theriault did not
have standing to bring a complaint regarding the Olympic selection because
Morgan had declined the invitation and USA Synchro had appointed Theriault
to the team.
Robinson v. USA Taekwondo145
In February 2012, the hearing panel determined that USA Taekwondo was
not fulfilling its obligations as a national governing body according to the Ted
Stevens Olympic Amateur Sports Act. As a result, the USOC Board placed
USA Taekwondo on probation for six months, and the hearing panel continued

143. Id. ¶ 5.5.
144. See generally Am. Arbitration Ass’n: N. Am. CAS Panel, AAA No. 77 190 00050 12
JENF (Mar. 26, 2012).
145. See generally In re USA Taekwondo's Probation (U.S. Olympic Comm. Sept. 24, 2012)
(on file with review).
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to monitor USA Taekwondo’s activities and progress. The panel later
extended USA Taekwondo’s probation for six additional months due to USA
Taekwondo’s progress failures. The USOC agreed with the extension of the
probation and ordered USA Taekwondo to review its governance structure and
to change its bylaws. Finally, the USOC ordered USA Taekwondo to hire a
financial expert to audit USA Taekwondo’s activities.
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
Generally, professional athletes are eligible to receive workers’
compensation benefits for injuries they suffer during their term of
employment. The athletes must give up the right to sue their employer if they
choose to receive wage replacements or other medical benefits. Injured
college athletes have also begun arguing that they are employees, even though
the NCAA says they are not. The following cases show a variety of workers’
compensation issues in the realm of sports.
Matthews v. NFL Management Council (NFLMC)146
Bruce Matthews, a former professional football player, appealed a
decision denying his motion to vacate an arbitration award that prevented him
from receiving workers’ compensation benefits. Matthews played in the NFL
for nineteen years and filed a workers’ compensation claim in California for
injuries he sustained during his career. Matthews did not play for any team
based in California, nor did he sustain any particular injury in California.
After Matthews filed the California claim, the NFLMC filed a grievance and
argued that Matthews had breached his employment agreement, which
provided that Tennessee law would govern any workers’ compensation claims.
Thereafter, and pursuant to a clause in Matthews’s employment contract, the
grievance went to arbitration, where the arbitrator found that Matthews
violated his employment agreement.
Matthews argued that the arbitration award was contrary to federal labor
law and California’s workers’ compensation law. However, the court declared
that Matthews had to prove that he was an employee under California law and
that he was injured in California or played football in California. Further,
Matthews’s limited contact with California prevented him from establishing
that any of his rights were taken away under federal labor law. Thus, the
appellate court upheld the arbitration award.

146. See generally 688 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2012).
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Stewart v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan147
Andrew Stewart played in the NFL for three years, during which time he
sustained various football-related injuries requiring surgical repair. Following
his NFL career, Stewart played four additional seasons in the Canadian
Football League (CFL). Fourteen years after retiring from the NFL, Stewart
sought to collect benefits from the NFL Player Retirement Plan because he
had constant pain from injuries he suffered while in the NFL.
The retirement plan offers four different types of monthly benefits for
disabled players. The first category, active football benefits, is for athletes
who became disabled while still playing in the NFL. The second type, active
non-football benefits, is given to players who became disabled while playing
in the NFL but not as a result of NFL activities. The third type, football
degenerative benefits, is provided to athletes who suffered disabilities within
fifteen years of retiring from the NFL. Finally, athletes can receive inactive
benefits if disabled after the fifteen-year retirement period.
In order for Stewart to bring his claim before the retirement plan, a doctor
had to diagnose him for his disability. Following the diagnosis, the retirement
plan awarded Stewart inactive benefits because his disability did not arise
from participating in NFL activities. Stewart requested football degenerative
benefits and appealed the plan’s initial determination to no avail. Stewart sued
the retirement plan following the denial of his appeal for denial of his ERISA
benefits.
Stewart prevailed in his ERISA claim because the retirement plan did not
have a process that used adequate reference materials and did not act using
reasoned and principled decision-making. The court concluded that the plan
abused its discretion in denying Stewart the football degenerative benefits and
awarded Stewart backdated benefits.
MISCELLANEOUS
The following sports-related cases do not involve any particular area of
law but include gambling, federal law issues, and public records actions.
Arlington Park Racecourse LLC v. Illinois Racing Board148
Arlington Park Racecourse appealed a circuit court ruling that affirmed the
Illinois Racing Board’s decision regarding the distribution of funds from the
Horse Racing Equity Trust Fund. Arlington Park Racecourse alleged that the
147. See generally No. WDQ-09-2612, 2012 WL 2374661 (D. Md. June 19, 2012).
148. See generally 980 N.E.2d 72 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
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board misinterpreted the distribution calculations detailed in the Illinois Horse
Racing Act, which governs distributions from the trust fund. Under the Act,
casinos located in Illinois that have annual adjusted gross receipts over $200
million are required to deposit 3% of the daily receipts into the trust fund. The
trust fund uses 60% of the money collected to pay out race purses and uses the
remaining 40% to operate and market racing facilities.
The court found that the distribution calculation in the Act was ambiguous
and that arguments could be made for both Arlington Park Racecourse and the
board; however, the court deferred to the board’s interpretation based on the
board’s experience in managing the racing industry.
Davis v. Byers Volvo149
Byers Volvo, an Ohio automobile dealership, paid ESPN college football
analyst Kirk Herbstreit to appear in television advertisements endorsing the
dealership. Trace Davis asserted that Herbstreit’s statements in those
advertisements were deceptive under the Federal Trade Commission’s Revised
Regulations (FTC Revised Guidelines). Davis took the car to the dealership
for service fourteen times without the dealership correcting the car’s problems.
Davis asserted that Herbstreit’s statements regarding the dealership could not
have been truthful based on the problems the dealership had in correcting
Davis’s car.
The trial court granted summary judgment for Byers Volvo. The appellate
court found that the FTC Revised Guidelines did not apply to Byers Volvo
because the advertisements occurred prior to the law’s enactment and that
Herbstreit’s statements did not lead to any inference regarding his beliefs
about Byers Volvo’s service department.
Ohio ex rel. ESPN, Inc. v. Ohio State University150
ESPN filed a public records request with The Ohio State University for
records relating to an NCAA investigation regarding the school’s football
team and Fine Link Ink tattoo parlor. ESPN requested the information twentyone times but was denied each time on the basis of the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).
Under FERPA, the school could not release educational records without
the consent of the student-athletes. The court denied ESPN’s request on the
basis that the records fell under FERPA guidelines because the records related
to information regarding the student-athletes scholastic performance and were
149. See generally No. 11CA817, 2012 WL 691757 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2012).
150. See generally 970 N.E.2d 939 (Ohio 2012).
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maintained by the school.
Williams v. NFL151
The NFL CBA at the time banned athletes from using steroids, stimulants,
and human growth hormone. Genos Williams failed a drug test when his urine
sample was deemed to not have been from a human. Accordingly, the NFL
suspended him, and Williams appealed to an arbitrator who found that he
violated the NFL’s substance abuse policy.
Following the arbitration decision, Williams sued the NFL to vacate the
award. The district court granted the NFL’s motion for summary judgment
and enforced the arbitration award because no facts were presented that would
lead the court to overturn the arbitration award.
CONCLUSION
The decisions discussed above, decided by courts and other arbitral bodies
during 2012, will have a strong impact on the sports industry and the everevolving body of sports law. This Survey does not include every sportsrelated decision from 2012; rather, it includes brief summaries of the most
important and most interesting decisions related to sports law.
Kayleigh R. Mayer, Managing and Survey Editor (2012–2013)
with contributions from Kathryn E. Bosley and Lauren A. Malizia

151. See generally 495 F. App’x 894 (10th Cir. 2012).

